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Although there is a burgeoning literature on the criminalization of 
migration,
1
 immigration issues are not usually included in academic 
conversations surrounding overcriminalization.
2
  Criminal law scholars may 
not have been particularly attuned to developments in the world of 
immigration law because they have understood it to be primarily the 
domain of civil or administrative law.
3
  For most of U.S. history, this has 
 
* Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine School of Law. 
1 See, e.g., Jennifer M. Chacón, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L. 
REV. SIDEBAR 135 (2009) [hereinafter Managing Migration]; Jennifer M. Chacón, 
Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control and National Security, 39 
CONN. L. REV. 1827 (2007) [hereinafter Unsecured Borders]; Ingrid Eagly, Prosecuting 
Immigration, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1281 (2010); Daniel Kanstroom, Criminalizing the 
Undocumented: Ironic Boundaries of the Post-September 11th “Pale of Law,” 29 N.C. J. 
INT’L L. & COM. REG. 639 (2004); Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration 
Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469 
(2009); Teresa A. Miller, Blurring the Boundaries Between Immigration and Crime Control 
After September 11, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 81 (2005); Teresa A. Miller, Citizenship & 
Severity: Recent Immigration Reforms and the New Penology, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611 
(2003); Juliet P. Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign 
Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367 (2006). 
2 Two recent symposia on the topic of overcriminalization, for example, have not 
included any discussions dedicated to the topic of immigration enforcement.  See Ellen S. 
Podgor, Foreword, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 565 (2011) (describing the contributions to the 
2010 George Mason symposium on overcriminalization); Ellen S. Podgor, Foreword: 
Overcriminalization: The Politics of Crime, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 541 (2005) (outlining the 
contributions to the 2005 American University Washington College of Law symposium on 
overcriminalization). 
3 Supreme Court jurisprudence reinforces this divide, making it clear that deportation is 
not a criminal punishment and that the procedural protections that apply in the criminal 
realm do not apply to the administrative proceedings associated with the removal of 
noncitizens.  See, e.g., Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 526 (2009) (“This Court has long 
understood that an ‘order of deportation is not a punishment for crime.’” (quoting Fong Yue 
Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893))); INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 
1039 (1984) (“The purpose of deportation is not to punish past transgressions but rather to 
put an end to a continuing violation of the immigration laws.”); Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 
730.  But cf. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1480 (2010) (recognizing that, because of 
changes in the immigration laws, “deportation is an integral part—indeed, sometimes the 
most important part—of the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants who 
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been the case.  Or perhaps the failure to consider immigration law in 
overcriminalization discussions has occurred because widespread 
enforcement of criminal immigration laws is a relatively new phenomenon.
4
  
Whatever the reasons, in an era when about half of all federal criminal 
prosecutions are of immigration crimes,
5
 and when many states and 
localities are enacting ordinances aimed at criminalizing offenses related to 
migration,
6
 now is a good time to start including immigration policy in the 
broader conversation on overcriminalization.  Increasingly, our immigration 
policy provides a paradigmatic example of overcriminalization, whereby 
governments—both state and local—are creating “too many crimes and 
criminaliz[ing] things that properly should not be crimes.”7  Like the war on 
drugs before it, the growing war on unauthorized migration is suddenly and 
dramatically being waged through the criminal justice system.  The 
distorting effects of this use of state and federal criminal justice systems are 
only beginning to show.
8
  Therefore, it seems particularly critical for 
scholars concerned with overcriminalization to take stock of recent 
developments in immigration enforcement. 
This Article argues that contemporary immigration policy is a site of 
overcriminalization.  To explain how this came to be the case, the Article 
first evaluates the major developments in immigration law and immigration 
enforcement that have increased the criminalization of immigration.  In the 
latter half of the twentieth century, three important assumptions 
undergirded immigration enforcement.  The first assumption was that the 
federal government had the exclusive power to regulate immigration.
9
  The 
 
plead guilty to specified crimes”).  The Court’s decision in Padilla v. Kentucky erodes some 
of the significance of the civil–criminal divide, at least for purposes of Sixth Amendment 
jurisprudence.  For a discussion on the significance of Padilla, see, for example, Anita Ortiz 
Maddali, Padilla v. Kentucky: A New Chapter in Supreme Court Jurisprudence on Whether 
Deportation Constitutes Punishment  for Lawful Permanent Residents?, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1 
(2011).  For a discussion of the difficulties experienced by state courts—many of which have 
been heretofore unfamiliar with the distinct legal sphere of immigration law—in 
implementing Padilla, see César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, When State Courts Meet 
Padilla: A Concerted Effort Is Needed to Bring State Courts Up to Speed on Crime-Based 
Immigration Law Provisions, 12 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 299 (2011). 
4 See discussion infra Part II. 
5 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
2009, at 1 (2011) [hereinafter FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2009], available at http://bjs.ojp.
usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs09.pdf. 
6 See discussion infra Part III. 
7 Darryl K. Brown, Criminal Law’s Unfortunate Triumph Over Administrative Law, 7 
J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 657, 657 (2011). 
8 See discussion infra Part IV. 
9 See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62–63 (1941); Chae Chan Ping v. United 
States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889); see also STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. 
RODRÍGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY, at x (5th ed. 2009). 
2012] OVERCRIMINALIZING IMMIGRATION 615 
second was that, although it was essentially the sole responsibility of the 
federal government to make and enforce immigration laws, the federal 
government was actually unable to achieve widespread enforcement of the 
federal immigration laws on the books.
10
  And the third assumption was that 
state and local governments not only had no role in the regulation of 
immigration, but also had very little to do with the enforcement of federal 
immigration law.
11
  Of course, these three general statements stand in for a 
more nuanced set of facts on the ground, but at a basic level, they generate a 
fairly accurate picture of the state of immigration enforcement as recently 
as fifteen years ago.
12
 
Over the past fifteen years, however, all three of these assumptions 
have given way to new realities.  This Article describes the transformation 
of these three fundamental assumptions of immigration law and discusses 
the new realities that have replaced them.  It also explains how the resulting 
changes in the underlying structure of immigration law and its enforcement 
have increased significantly the use of the criminal law as a means to effect 
immigration control.  Part I discusses the apparent decline of federal 
 
10 See, e.g., Deborah Sontag, Chaos at the Gates: Porous Deportation System Gives 
Criminals Little to Fear, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1994, at A1.  With the passage of the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Congress intended to normalize the status of a 
significant percentage of the unauthorized population (then estimated at four to six million), 
and to enforce the law so as to prevent the future development of a sizeable unauthorized 
population in the future.  LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 9, at 1158.  But by 1995, the 
government’s estimated unauthorized population was again at around five million.  U.S. 
IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., ESTIMATES OF THE UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT 
POPULATION RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES: 1990 TO 2000, at 10 (2003), available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/Ill_Report_1211.pdf.  Researchers 
estimate that the number of unauthorized migrants had grown to around ten million by 2004.  
JEFFREY S. PASSEL, RANDY CAPPS & MICHAEL FIX, UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS: FACTS AND 
FIGURES 1 (2004) (estimating the undocumented population at 9.3 million), available at 
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/1000587_undoc_immigrants_facts.pdf. 
11 See Michael A. Olivas, Immigration-Related State and Local Ordinances: Preemption, 
Prejudice, and the Proper Role for Enforcement, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 27, 34 (2007) 
(“[S]tate, county, and local ordinances aimed at regulating general immigration functions are 
unconstitutional as a function of exclusive federal preemptory powers.”); Michael J. 
Wishnie, State and Local Police Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
1084, 1089 (2004) (“[O]n the whole, enforcement of the immigration statutes has 
traditionally been the province of federal immigration officials.”).  But see Clare Huntington, 
The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Federalism, 61 VAND. L. REV. 787, 792 
(2008) (arguing that “immigration is more like areas of constitutional law that involve a mix 
of federal and state authority”); Peter J. Spiro, Learning to Live with Immigration 
Federalism, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1627, 1627 (1997) (observing and celebrating the fact that 
“states are emerging as major players in immigration law- and policy-making”). 
12 See, e.g., Sontag, supra note 10; INS ‘Enforcement Deficit’ Tied to Law, WASH. POST, 
Feb. 2, 1995, at A3; see also LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 9, at 1148–52 (describing 
increased resources devoted to border enforcement as a development of the mid-1990s and 
increased interior enforcement as an even more recent development). 
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exclusivity in immigration regulation and the rise of state and local 
legislation—particularly state criminal laws—aimed at controlling 
migration.  Part II discusses the significant expansion of federal 
immigration enforcement efforts and, in particular, the recent dramatic rise 
in the use of federal criminal sanctions as a means of enforcing immigration 
laws.  Part III discusses the rise of state and local participation in the 
enforcement of federal immigration laws and the consequent increase in the 
policing of low-level state criminal offenses in certain communities. 
While no one would dispute that the criminalization of migration has 
increased over the past decade,
13
 this leaves open the question of whether 
this is an appropriate policy response or whether the resulting policies can 
be described as overcriminalization.  Therefore, the final section of the 
paper explains why these policies constitute overcriminalization and 
suggests alternative approaches to immigration enforcement specifically 
and to immigration policy more generally. 
 
13 At least two other shifts in immigration policies can be said to have increased the 
criminalization of migration.  The first is that, through legislation enacted in 1988, 1994, and 
especially in 1996, Congress has significantly expanded the immigration consequences of 
criminal offenses.  In other words, for noncitizens, the list of crimes that can result in 
expulsion (or inadmissibility) has significantly expanded.  This has tightened the link 
between criminal law and immigration enforcement.  See Jennifer M. Chacón, Whose 
Community Shield? Examining the Removal of the “Criminal Street Gang Member,” 2007 
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 317, 321–23 (2007) (describing the relevant legislative enactments of 1988, 
1994, and 1996).  Most notably, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
(“AEDPA”) greatly expanded the definition of what constitutes an “aggravated felony” for 
purposes of immigration law.  Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 440, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified 
as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2006)).  Second, the nominally civil immigration 
system has increasingly assumed the punitive features of the criminal law system, but 
without the procedural protections that generally apply in criminal proceedings.  See Anil 
Kalhan, Rethinking Immigration Detention, 110 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 42, 47–50 (2010) 
(discussing the “excesses” of immigration detention); Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path 
of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 469, 472 (2007) (“Those features of the criminal justice model that can roughly be 
classified as enforcement have indeed been imported [to the civil immigration system].  
Those that relate to adjudication—in particular, the bundle of procedural rights recognized in 
criminal cases—have been consciously rejected . . . .  [I]mmigration law has been absorbing 
the theories, methods, perceptions, and priorities of the criminal enforcement model while 
rejecting the criminal adjudication model in favor of a civil regulatory regime.”). 
I discuss the administrative immigration detention issue as part of a broader discussion 
on the expansion of federal immigration enforcement.  See discussion infra Part II.  Because 
the first trend does not fit neatly within the rubric of “overcriminalization,” I do not dedicate 
extensive space to that discussion.  Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that the 
problems of overcriminalization discussed herein are understated insofar as they only 
partially account for the increasingly punitive administrative processes aimed at noncitizens. 
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I. THE DECLINE OF FEDERAL EXCLUSIVITY IN THE REGULATION OF 
IMMIGRATION 
Over the past two decades, states and localities have become 
increasingly active in regulating immigration, defying the notion that 
immigration regulation is a power exclusively reserved to the federal 
government.  This Part begins by explaining how, over the past 150 years, 
federal courts generally struck down sub-federal efforts to regulate 
immigration and articulated a very narrow set of parameters within which 
states would be allowed to regulate immigration.  Next, this Part discusses 
how states and localities recently have enacted a number of provisions—
primarily criminal provisions—to indirectly regulate migration.  States and 
localities often have been forthcoming about the fact that these provisions 
are designed to affect immigration, for example by achieving “attrition [of 
unauthorized migrants] through enforcement” of these laws.”14  Rather than 
striking all of these laws down as impermissible, however, courts have 
given states a surprising amount of latitude to regulate noncitizens through 
their substantive criminal laws and criminal law enforcement.
15
  Finally, 
this Part critiques states’ increasing reliance on the criminal law as a tool to 
address the issue of migration, notwithstanding the fact that immigration 
generally poses little or no threat to public safety or security.
16
  Ironically, 
sub-federal criminal law is increasingly used to manage a problem that has 




14 Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act (S.B. 1070), ch. 113, § 1, 
2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 450, 450 [hereinafter S.B. 1070]. 
15 See discussion infra at Part I.B. 
16 RUBÉN G. RUMBAUT & WALTER A. EWING, IMMIGRATION POLICY CTR., AM. 
IMMIGRATION LAW FOUND., THE MYTH OF IMMIGRANT CRIMINALITY AND THE PARADOX OF 
ASSIMILATION: INCARCERATION RATES AMONG NATIVE AND FOREIGN-BORN MEN 6–8 (2007), 
available at http://www.cata-farmworkers.org/english%20pages/Myth.pdf (noting much 
lower incarceration rates among immigrants than among similarly situated native-born 
citizens); Corina Graif & Robert J. Sampson, Spatial Heterogeneity in the Effects of 
Immigration and Diversity on Neighborhood Homicide Rates, 13 HOMICIDE STUD. 242, 243 
(2009) (noting that “research has largely found an insignificant or negative link between 
immigrant status and crime” and, in an original study, finding no correlation or an inverse 
correlation between immigrant concentrations and homicide rates); Kristen F. Butcher & 
Ann Morrison Piehl, Why Are Immigrants’ Incarceration Rates So Low? Evidence on 
Selective Immigration, Deterrence, and Deportation 26–27 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi., 
Working Paper No. 2005-19, 2005), available at http://www.chicagofed.org/digital_assets/
publications/working_papers/2005/wp2005_19.pdf (finding that immigrants are a self-
selecting group that tends to have a lower crime rate than the native-born population). 
17 See discussion infra at Part I.C. 
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A. THE RISE OF FEDERAL EXCLUSIVITY IN THE REGULATION OF 
IMMIGRATION 
The notion that the federal government has exclusive power to regulate 
immigration is fairly well-established as a matter of constitutional law.  It is 
certainly true that in the early days of the nation, including much of the 
nineteenth century, sub-federal entities actively regulated immigration.
18
  
Many states had laws barring entry to paupers, individuals with certain 
diseases, and racially undesirable groups.
19
  These barriers to entry applied 
not just to immigrants from other countries, but also to migrants from other 
states.
20
  States also sought to control the composition of their populations 




It was in the context of the latter sort of initiative that the Supreme 
Court first began to chip away at sub-federal immigration regulation.  In 
Henderson v. Mayor of New York, the Supreme Court declared that only 
Congress could regulate migration through the imposition of head taxes.
22
  
In the decades that followed, the federal government increasingly 
centralized immigration control.  In 1875, Congress enacted the first 
restrictive federal immigration law—the Page Act—which prohibited the 
entry of immigrants deemed undesirable, including certain contract laborers 
and women who entered with the intent of engaging in prostitution.
23
  The 
law was clearly designed and enforced so as to restrict entry of Chinese 
immigrants in the face of growing anti-Chinese sentiment in the western 
United States.
24
  Indeed, Congress followed up the Page Act with the 
enactment of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882.
25
  In the case upholding 
the constitutionality of the Act, the Supreme Court made sweeping 
 
18 See Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776–1875), 
93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1833–34 (1993). 
19 Id. at 1883 (“[S]tate immigration law in the century preceding 1875 included five 
major categories: regulation of the migration of convicts; regulation of persons likely to 
become or actually becoming a public charge; prevention of the spread of contagious 
diseases, including maritime quarantine and suspension of communication by land; and 
regionally varying policies relating to slavery, including prohibition of the slave trade, bans 
on the migration of free blacks, and the seamen’s acts.”). 
20 See id. at 1834; see also Kerry Abrams, The Hidden Dimension of Nineteenth-Century 
Immigration Law, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1353, 1355 (2009). 
21 Neuman, supra note 18, at 1850, 1855, 1858; see also Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 
580, 586 (1884); Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259, 261 (1875). 
22 92 U.S. at 274. 
23 Page Act of 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477, 477 (repealed 1974). 
24 See Kerry Abrams, Polygamy, Prostitution, and the Federalization of Immigration 
Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 641, 647, 691, 702, 710 (2005). 
25 Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882) (repealed 1943). 
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statements about the broad power of Congress to regulate immigration, 
writing: 
The power of exclusion of foreigners being an incident of sovereignty belonging to 
the government of the United States, as a part of those sovereign powers delegated by 
the Constitution, the right to its exercise at any time when, in the judgment of the 
government, the interests of the country require it, cannot be granted away or 
restrained on behalf of any one.  The powers of government are delegated in trust to 
the United States, and are incapable of transfer to any other parties.
26
 
Over time, the statement of absolute power over immigration law was 
construed to limit to the federal government the power to regulate entry and 
exit.
27
  The Court made it clear that while a state could act within its 
traditional spheres of state power, such as licensing of businesses, it could 
do so only to the extent that any indirect regulation of immigration did not 
conflict with the federal immigration scheme.  In DeCanas v. Bica, the 
Court therefore upheld a California statute prohibiting the employment of 
unauthorized immigrants because at that time, there was no comprehensive 
scheme for regulating the employment of such workers.
28
  But generally, 
the Court rather jealously protected the prerogative of the federal 
government in immigration enforcement.
29
 
Even when policies aimed at noncitizens did not expressly contravene 
federal immigration law, the Court was willing to strike down state efforts 
to regulate noncitizens to the extent they were deemed insufficiently 
complementary of congressional objectives.  This was obviously the case in 
Hines v. Davidowitz, where a Pennsylvania law that did not conflict with 
federal law was deemed preempted simply because the federal government 
occupied the field,
30
 for example.  But the Court also applied a similar 
analysis to a Texas law that would have required undocumented immigrant 
 
26 Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889); see also Chy Lung v. 
Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875) (“The passage of laws which concern the admission of 
citizens and subjects of foreign nations to our shores belongs to Congress, and not to the 
States. It has the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations: the responsibility for the 
character of those regulations, and for the manner of their execution, belongs solely to the 
national government. If it be otherwise, a single state can, at her pleasure, embroil us in 
disastrous quarrels with other nations.”). 
27 The following three paragraphs draw from and elaborate upon a brief discussion in 
Jennifer M. Chacón, The Transformation of Immigration Federalism, 21 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J., at Part I (forthcoming 2013). 
28 424 U.S. 351 (1976). 
29 See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66–67 (1941) (“[W]here the federal 
government . . . has enacted a complete scheme of regulation and has therein provided a 
standard for the registration of aliens, states cannot, inconsistently with the purpose of 
Congress, conflict or interfere with, curtail or complement, the federal law, or enforce 
additional or auxiliary regulations.”). 
30 Hines, 312 U.S. at 66–67. 
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students to pay for their education in public elementary and high schools in 
Plyler v. Doe.
31
  The Court struck the law down as a violation of those 
students’ right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.32  
Since the Texas law did not create new categories of authorized and 
unauthorized migrants, and since it regulated an area—education—long 
understood to be the prerogative of the states,
33
 it would be possible to 
imagine that the Court might uphold the regulation as a lawful regulation of 
noncitizens, operating permissibly and complementarily in the interstices of 
federal immigration law.  But that is not what happened.  Instead, in Plyler 
v. Doe, the Court wrote: 
As we recognized in DeCanas v. Bica, the States do have some authority to act with 
respect to illegal aliens, at least where such action mirrors federal objectives and 
furthers a legitimate state goal.  In DeCanas, the State’s program reflected Congress’ 
intention to bar from employment all aliens except those possessing a grant of 
permission to work in this country.  In contrast, there is no indication that the 
disability imposed by [the Texas statute] corresponds to any identifiable congressional 
policy.  The State does not claim that the conservation of state educational resources 
was ever a congressional concern in restricting immigration.  More importantly, the 




The reasoning of Plyler clarifies that even when states pass laws in a 
domain of traditional state power like education, the constitutionality of 
those laws is not assured simply because the law does not conflict with 
federal law.  Instead, Plyler suggests that to withstand constitutional 
scrutiny, a state law that creates unique obligations or disabilities for 
noncitizens—including undocumented noncitizens—must further a 
legitimate state goal, correspond to a specific, identifiable congressional 
policy, and operate harmoniously with federal immigration regulation. 
In short, from the 1880s through the 1980s, the Supreme Court made it 
clear that Congress controlled federal immigration policy.  States could 
only act indirectly to manage migration, and only when such actions fell 
within the traditional scope of their power and where such actions were 
“harmonious” with federal policy.  Over the past few years, however, 
scholars and policymakers have raised new challenges to the notion of 
federal exclusivity in the realm of immigration policy.  This, in turn, has 
given rise to a preemption jurisprudence that is more accepting of sub-
federal immigration regulations, including regulations that are not 
 
31 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 225 (1982); see also id. at 237 n.1 (Powell, J., 
concurring). 
32 Id., at 230 (majority opinion). 
33 TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.031 (Vernon Supp. 1981), invalidated by Plyler, 457 U.S. 
at 230–31. 
34 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 225–26 (citations omitted). 
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completely harmonious with federal regulations. 
B. THE CHALLENGE TO FEDERAL EXCLUSIVITY IN IMMIGRATION 
REGULATION 
A wave of state and local immigration ordinances is sweeping across 
the nation.  In recent years, thousands of local governments around the 
country have debated or enacted ordinances designed to restrict the ability 
of unauthorized migrants to live and work in their communities.
35
  One 
high-profile example comes from the town of Hazleton, Pennsylvania, 
where local officials enacted an ordinance that prohibited landlords from 
renting to noncitizens present without legal authorization and also allowed 
for the revocation of the business licenses of any business owner who 
employed an unauthorized worker.
36
  Other localities have enacted narrower 
provisions—such as regulations designed to deter day laborers from 
soliciting work in public spaces.
37
 
States have also joined the fray.  In 1994, California voters passed 
Proposition 187,
38
 a measure aimed at curbing undocumented migration to 
the state through the elimination of state benefits (including, fatally for the 
law, public K–12 education).39  That law was quickly enjoined by a federal 
district court
40
 and languished when the state’s governor declined to pursue 
the state’s legal defense of the law in court.41  Fifteen years later, however, 
the country once again witnessed the rise of state ordinances that, while 
 
35 MONICA W. VARSANYI, TAKING LOCAL CONTROL 3 (2010) (“In 2006, 500 bills were 
considered, 84 of which became law.  In 2007, 1,562 immigration- and immigrant-related 
pieces of legislation were introduced, and 240 became law.  And most recently, in 2009, 
approximately 1,500 laws and resolutions were considered in all 50 state legislatures, and 
353 were ultimately enacted.”); Gabriel J. Chin et al., A Legal Labyrinth: Issues Raised by 
Arizona Senate Bill 1070, 25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 47, 49 (2010); Cristina M. Rodríguez, The 
Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 570 (2008). 
36 Orde F. Kittrie, Federalism, Deportation, and Crime Victims Afraid to Call the Police, 
91 IOWA L. REV. 1449, 1455 (2006); see also Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 176 
(3d Cir. 2010), vacated sub nom. City of Hazleton, Pa. v. Lozano, 131 S. Ct. 2958 (2011). 
37 See, e.g., REDONDO BEACH, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 3-7.1601 (2010); see also 
Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach, 475 F. Supp. 2d 952, 
955 (C.D. Cal. 2006), aff’d, 657 F.3d 936 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
38 1994 Cal. Stat. A-317 (approved by electors Nov. 8, 1994). 
39 Id. at A-317, § 1. 
40 League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 997 F. Supp. 1244, 1250 (C.D. Cal. 
1997). 
41 Patrick J. McDonnell, Davis Won’t Appeal Prop. 187 Ruling, Ending Court Battles, 
L.A. TIMES, July 29, 1999, at A1, available at http://articles.latimes.com/1999/jul/29/news/
mn-60700 (“Attorneys for Gov. Gray Davis and civil rights organizations have reached an 
agreement to end the litigation surrounding Proposition 187, effectively killing the landmark 
1994 ballot referendum that targeted illegal immigrants and became a pivotal juncture in 
California’s political life.”). 
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purportedly crafted to avoid the constitutional problems encountered by 
Proposition 187’s education provisions, actually sweep far beyond the 
scope of Proposition 187 in other respects. 
Over the last five years, lawmakers have proposed more than 7,000 
state immigration proposals.
42
  While ordinances such as the Legal Arizona 
Workers Act (LAWA) are narrowly aimed at denying business licenses to 
employers who hire unauthorized workers,
43
 many states have recently 
enacted much broader ordinances designed to regulate the employment of, 
housing for, policing of, and benefits available to undocumented 
immigrants. 
The Arizona legislature ignited a national firestorm when it enacted a 
bill—signed into law by Governor Jan Brewer on April 23, 2010—that 
greatly expanded the role Arizona’s state and local officials play in the 
enforcement of immigration law.
44
  The Support Our Law Enforcement and 
Safe Neighborhoods Act,
45
 often referred to as S.B. 1070, effectively sought 
to impose criminal liability based on undocumented presence in the United 
States.  Although proponents of the law argued that it mirrors federal 
immigration law,
46
 this was clearly not the case.  Among other things, the 
law made state criminal offenses out of violations that were formally crimes 
only at the federal level
47
 and criminalized conduct that is neither a civil nor 




42 NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATORS, 2011 IMMIGRATION-RELATED LAWS AND 
RESOLUTIONS IN THE STATES (JAN. 1–DEC. 7, 2011) 2 (no publication date), available at 
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/immig/2011ImmFinalReportDec.pdf. 
43 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-211 to -214 (Supp. 2011); see also Chamber of 
Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1973 (2011) (upholding the constitutionality 
of LAWA). 
44 Randal C. Archibold, Arizona Enacts Stringent Law on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
24, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/24/us/politics/24immig.html. 
45 Ch. 113, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 450. 
46 See Gabriel J. Chin & Marc Miller, The Unconstitutionality of State Regulation of 
Immigration through Criminal Law, 61 DUKE L.J. 251, 252 (2011) (discussing the “mirror 
image” theory of sub-federal immigration enforcement and arguing that even the criminal 
provisions that “mirror” federal immigration law are unconstitutional). 
47 Compare, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1509 (Supp. 2011) (criminalizing “willful 
failure to complete or carry an alien registration document”), with 8 U.S.C. §§ 1304(e), 
1306(a) (2006) (criminalizing similar violations as federal misdemeanors).  The Supreme 
Court has found previous state efforts to enact alien registration schemes that run parallel to 
the federal scheme unconstitutional.  Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941). 
48 Chin et al., supra note 35, at 50.  Compare, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2928(C) 
(making it a crime for an “unauthorized alien to knowingly apply for work, solicit work in a 
public place or perform work as an employee or independent contractor in this state”), with 8 
U.S.C. § 1324(a) (2006) (prohibiting employers from knowingly hiring unauthorized 
workers but containing no provision criminalizing a worker’s act of soliciting or performing 
work).  I have written a more detailed analysis of S.B. 1070 and the Supreme Court 
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S.B. 1070 also “imposes new duties and creates new powers designed 
to increase [state and local law enforcement’s] investigation of immigration 
status, arrests of removable individuals, reporting of undocumented 
immigrants to federal authorities, and assistance in removal by delivering 
removable noncitizens to federal authorities.”49  Major provisions of the law 
were enjoined by U.S. District Court Judge Bolton, and the injunction was 
upheld by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and largely upheld by the 
Supreme Court, with a significant exception.
50
  While the case was pending 







 enacted provisions that looked very similar to Arizona’s 
S.B. 1070. 
Alabama enacted immigration regulations that not only mirrored some 
of Arizona’s controversial provisions, but also extended far beyond 
anything that Arizona tried to do.  Indeed, Alabama’s H.B. 56 is the most 
draconian state regulation to be enacted in the period before the Supreme 
Court’s consideration of the Arizona law.  It not only would have restricted 
 
jurisprudence up to and including the challenge to this law in Chacón, supra note 27.  I draw 
upon that work in my discussions of S.B. 1070, United States v. Arizona, and Chamber of 
Commerce v. Whiting in this Subpart. 
49 Chin et al., supra note 35, at 62. 
50 United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 1008 (D. Ariz. 2010), aff’d, 641 F.3d 
339 (9th Cir. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 
(2012).  The Supreme Court reversed the injunction of S.B. 1070’s Section 2, which requires 
law enforcement officials to investigate immigration status upon arrest and, when practicable 
during a lawful stop, upon reasonable suspicion of an immigration violation.  Arizona, 132 S. 
Ct. at 2510–11. 
51 Marjorie Cortez, Utah Gov. Gary Herbert Signs Immigration Bills into Law, DESERET 
NEWS (Mar. 15, 2011, 4:19 PM), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/705368733/Utah-Gov-
Gary-Herbert-signs-immigration-bills-into-law.html (discussing Utah’s enactment of a 
moderate form of Arizona’s S.B. 1070, along with an attempted state-level guest worker 
program). 
52 Beason–Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act (H.B. 56), 2011 Ala. 
Laws [hereinafter H.B. 56].  Several of the major provisions of this bill have been enjoined. 
United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2012) (enjoining provisions including 
those relating to alien registration; criminalization of working without authorization; 
employer sanctions; invalidation of the enforcement of contracts with unauthorized migrants; 
and prohibition on applications for identity cards and licenses).  For a critique of the 
Alabama law that situates the law in a larger historical and cultural context, see Kevin R. 
Johnson, Immigration and Civil Rights: Is the “New” Birmingham the Same as the “Old” 
Birmingham?, WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. (forthcoming 2013). 
53 S.C. CODE ANN. § 6-1-170 (2008), amended by Act of June 27, 2011, No. 69, 2011 
S.C. Acts; see also Reid J. Epstein, Haley OKs S.C. Immigration Cops, POLITICO (June 27, 
2011), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0611/57874.html (describing South Carolina’s 
immigration laws as similar to Arizona’s, but including additional provisions for a state 
immigration enforcement unit).  Much of that bill was enjoined in December 2011.  Robbie 
Brown, Parts of Immigration Law Blocked in South Carolina, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2011, at 
A18. 
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renting to and employing unauthorized workers, but also would have 
nullified any contracts when one party was an undocumented immigrant, 
required the police to check the papers of anyone lawfully detained upon 
reasonable suspicion that the individual was present without authorization, 
mandated that public school officials determine and report on students’ 
immigration status, and criminalized the act of knowingly “concealing, 
harboring or shielding” an unauthorized migrant.54  This final provision was 
so broad that it prompted a group of religious leaders to file a constitutional 
challenge arguing that the Alabama law infringed on their religious 
mission.
55
  Sub-federal regulation of immigration is not a new phenomenon, 
but in their anti-immigrant aim, their scale, and their scope, these state-level 
ordinances are unprecedented in modern U.S. history.
56
 
The growing efforts on the part of states and localities to participate in 
immigration regulation are pushing courts to reexamine assumptions about 
federal exclusivity in this sphere.  In the decades since the Court decided 
Plyler v. Doe, the scholarly consensus concerning federal preemption in 
immigration regulation has eroded somewhat.
57
  A diverse group of legal 
 
54 H.B. 56 §§ 10–13, 16–18, 27, 28 & 30; 2011 ALA. CODE §§ 31-13-10 to -13, 31-13-16 
to -18, 31-13-26 to -27, 31-13-28 to -29 & 31-13-30; see also A. ELENA LACAYO, NAT’L 
COUNCIL OF LA RAZA, THE WRONG APPROACH: STATE ANTI-IMMIGRATION LEGISLATION IN 
2011, at 15 (2012), available at http://www.nclr.org/images/uploads/publications/The_
Wrong_Approach_Anti-ImmigrationLeg.pdf (“While Georgia and South Carolina passed 
bills more draconian than SB 1070, both are surpassed in harshness by Alabama HB 56, 
signed by Republican Governor Robert Bentley on June 9.”).  Although the provision 
requiring investigation of immigration status (H.B. 56 § 12, ALA. CODE § 31-13-12) has been 
allowed into effect pursuant to the Supreme Court’s ruling in United States v. Arizona, most 
of the other provisions of the law have been enjoined at this time.  See supra note 52. 
55 Justice Dept. Challenges Alabama Immigration Law, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2011, at 
A16 (“On Monday, Roman Catholic, United Methodist and Episcopal bishops filed a 
lawsuit, saying the law ‘makes it a crime to follow God’s command to be Good 
Samaritans.’”).  The federal government and a coalition of civil and immigrants’ rights 
organizations also challenged the law.  Id. 
56 Nativist sentiments and anti-immigrant policies in times of economic hardship are 
certainly not new.  In the era of the Great Depression, for example, tens of thousands of 
Mexicans and Mexican-Americans were sent to Mexico, even though many of those 
“repatriated” were in fact U.S. citizens who had never been in Mexico.  See generally 
FRANCISCO E. BALDERRAMA & RAYMOND RODRÍGUEZ, DECADE OF BETRAYAL: MEXICAN 
REPATRIATION IN THE 1930S (1995) (analyzing the history of the “repatriation” campaign); F. 
ARTURO ROSALES, CHICANO! THE HISTORY OF THE MEXICAN AMERICAN CIVIL RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT 26–86 (2d rev. ed. 1997) (same).  The Chinese Exclusion Act also grew out of 
economic anxiety.  See LUCY E. SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS: CHINESE IMMIGRATION 
AND THE SHAPING OF MODERN IMMIGRATION LAW 7 (1995).  But regulations and discourse 
around sub-federal immigration regulation have changed substantially in recent years, 
facilitating this wave of sub-federal immigration regulation.  See discussion infra at Part III. 
57 Of course, a significant number of scholars continue to argue quite persuasively 
against a larger role for states and localities in immigration regulation, both on constitutional 
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scholars has taken the view that the Constitution does not require federal 




The Supreme Court gave tentative voice to similar views in its recent 
decision in U.S. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting.
59
  That case involved a 
challenge to the Legal Arizona Workers Act, which provides that the 
licenses of state employers that knowingly or intentionally hire 
unauthorized workers may be (and, in some cases, must be) revoked; the 
statute also requires that all Arizona employers use the federal electronic 
employment authorization database known as E-Verify.
60
  The Court found 
that the regulation was not preempted by federal laws restricting the 
employment of unauthorized workers because it was a licensing scheme, 
which fell “squarely within the savings clause” of the federal law that 
expressly preempted “any State or local law imposing civil or criminal 
sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws) upon those who 
employ . . . unauthorized aliens.”61  Perhaps most tellingly for the course of 
future litigation, the Court rejected the argument that the law was impliedly 
preempted because it upset the careful balance between employment 
restrictions and antidiscrimination protections struck by the Immigration 
 
and on policy grounds.  See, e.g., Olivas, supra note 11, at 34 (arguing that “state, county, 
and local ordinances aimed at regulating general immigration functions are unconstitutional 
as a function of exclusive federal preemptory powers”); Huyen Pham, The Inherent Flaws of 
the Inherent Authority Position: Why Inviting Local Enforcement of Immigration Laws 
Violates the Constitution, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 965, 967 (2004) (arguing that “the 
immigration power is an exclusively federal power that must be exercised uniformly”); 
Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry: Devolution of the Immigration Power, Equal 
Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493, 497 (2001) (reasoning that the 
“immigration power is an exclusively federal one that Congress may not devolve by statute 
to the states”). 
58 See, e.g., Huntington, supra note 11, at 792 (arguing that “the constitutional mandate 
for federal exclusivity over pure immigration law is far more contestable than the traditional 
debate would suggest”).  While Huntington stresses the constitutionality of sub-federal 
immigration regulation, Cristina Rodriguez also argues that there is a functional need for 
such regulation.  See Cristina M. Rodriguez, supra note 35, at 571–72 (2008) (“[T]he federal 
exclusivity principle obscures our structural need for federal, state, and local participation in 
immigration regulation.  Today’s realities suggest different structural imperatives—namely 
the need for subfederal regulation.” (footnote omitted)); see also Spiro, supra note 11, at 
1636 (“Affording the states discretion to act on their preferences diminishes the pressure on 
the structure as a whole; otherwise, because you don’t let off the steam, sooner or later the 
roof comes off.”). 
59 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011).  As previously noted, my discussion of the Chamber of 
Commerce v. Whiting case draws in part from my discussion of the case in Chacón, supra 
note 27. 
60 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-211 to -214 (Supp. 2011). 
61 Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1973 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2006)). 
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Reform and Control Act of 1986
62—an argument that had actually carried 
the day in the Third Circuit in litigation involving the Hazleton, 
Pennsylvania, employment ordinance.
63
  Chief Justice Roberts chided that 
“[i]mplied preemption analysis does not justify a free-wheeling judicial 
inquiry into whether a state statute is in tension with federal objectives.”64 
Although much of the reasoning of Whiting explores the effects of the 
savings clause of the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act on state 
licensing provisions,
65
 the opinion’s language concerning implied 
preemption suggests that unless Congress has expressly barred states from 
enacting particular immigration-control provisions, the Court will be 
somewhat reluctant to invalidate those efforts on preemption grounds.
66
  
This seems very different from the preemption language used by the Court 
in Hines v. Davidowitz in striking down a state alien registration scheme 
that ran parallel to the federal scheme.
67
  The Court’s reasoning in Whiting, 
which prompted its later remand of the Third Circuit’s decision in Hazleton 
v. Lozano,
68
 has left the door open for state and local regulation of the 
employment of unauthorized workers so long as such laws rely on federal 
classification concerning who is authorized to work.
69
  More significantly, 
the Court’s suggestion that it will employ a narrow form of implied 
preemption analysis emboldened state legislatures around the country that 
seek to regulate migration with tools far beyond business licensing 
limitations. 
More recently, the Court seemed to back away from its seemingly 
deep skepticism of field and obstacle preemption analysis in the context of 
immigration.  In Arizona v. United States, a majority of Justices employed a 
traditional field preemption analysis—with citation to Hines v. 
Davidowitz—to strike down the alien registration offense in Section 3 of 
S.B. 1070.
70
  The Court struck down the law’s criminal prohibition on 
 
62 Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 
U.S.C.); see Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1981–85. 
63 Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 175 (3d Cir. 2010), vacated sub nom. City 
of Hazleton, Pa. v. Lozano, 131 S. Ct. 2958 (2011). 
64 Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1985 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
65 See id. at 1977–81. 
66 See id. at 1981–85. 
67 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. at 66–67. 
68 Lozano, 131 S. Ct. at 2958 (remanding the case for further consideration in light of 
Whiting). 
69 For a critique of the Court’s new approach to the preemption question, see Lauren 
Gilbert, Immigrant Laws, Obstacle Preemption and the Lost Legacy of McCulloch, 33 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 153 (2012). 
70 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501–03 (2012).  I have written a more 
detailed analysis of the case and its reasoning in Chacón, supra note 27. 
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working without authorization on the grounds that it was obstacle 
preempted by the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA).
71
  
And it also used obstacle preemption analysis to strike down Section 6, 
which would have allowed local officials to arrest individuals on the ground 
that they had committed removable offenses.
72
  But it did uphold Section 2, 
requiring investigation of immigration status for some individuals lawfully 
stopped and all individuals arrested, rejecting the federal government’s 
argument that this provision, too, was preempted under a theory of obstacle 
preemption.
73
  A more traditional and robust application of obstacle 




C. SUB-FEDERAL CRIMINALIZATION OF MIGRATION 
As previously noted, after the Court issued its decision in Whiting, 
several states enacted broad criminal provisions in an effort to do indirectly 
what they cannot do directly: regulate immigration law.  Efforts to 
criminalize undocumented labor and the failure to carry alien registration 
papers are now barred in the wake of United States v. Arizona;
75
 efforts to 
criminalize alien smuggling are also under scrutiny in the courts.
76
  But 
efforts to empower local enforcement of federal immigration laws have 
gained traction.
77
  A number of other states have also criminalized 
“trafficking” in recent years.78  Although legislation to prevent human 
 
71 Id. at 2503–05. 
72 Id. at 2505–07. 
73 Id. at 2507–11. 
74 For a more detailed critique of the Court’s reasoning and holding in this portion of the 
opinion, see Chacón, supra note 27, at Part III. 
75 Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2501–07. 
76 H.B. 56 § 13; Ala. Code § 31-13-13.  The District Court enjoined Alabama’s anti-
smuggling provision in an order dated September 28, 2011, United States v. Alabama, 813 F. 
Supp. 2d 1282, 1351 (N.D. Ala. 2011), and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part, 691 F.3d 
1269 (2012).  The Arizona district court originally declined to enjoin Arizona’s anti-
smuggling provision, United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 999–1000 (D. Ariz. 
2010), but recently revisited that decision and enjoined the provision, citing the reasoning of 
the Eleventh Circuit.  Valle Del Sol v. Whiting, No. CV 10-1061-PHX-SRB (D. Ariz., Sept. 
5, 2012) (enjoining the anti-smuggling provisions of S.B. 1070).  Arizona has used its anti-
smuggling law for years to prosecute migrants for smuggling themselves.  See Ingrid V. 
Eagly, Local Immigration Prosecution: A Study of Arizona Before SB 1070, 58 UCLA L. 
REV. 1749 (2011) (discussing prosecutions of unauthorized migrants under Arizona’s 2005 
criminal prohibition on alien smuggling). 
77 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. at 2510–11 (reversing the injunction of Arizona 
S.B. 1070’s section 2(B)). 
78 See Jennifer M. Chacón, Tensions and Trade-offs: Protecting Trafficking Victims in 
the Era of Immigration Enforcement, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1609, 1647 n.164 (2010). 
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trafficking is laudable, some of these laws have been codified in ways that 
allow state officials to enforce immigration laws indirectly.
79
  Indeed, some 
legislators have been quite candid in stating that this was one of the driving 
forces behind the adoption of these laws, yet these provisions have not been 
challenged on preemption grounds.
80
 
Clearly, states have not limited their efforts to regulate immigration to 
areas in the interstices of federal regulation of the employment of 
noncitizens.  Instead, they have deployed a host of criminal laws and 
ordinances to achieve indirectly that which they cannot achieve directly: the 
regulation of immigration law in their states.  Juliet Stumpf has explained 
that this is not surprising given that the police power is a place where a 
state’s authority is at its height.81  State efforts that criminalize activities in 
order to affect migration indirectly have, in many cases, avoided court 
scrutiny, and the Supreme Court’s Arizona decision evinces tolerance for 
sub-federal participation in enforcement efforts.  States interested in 
controlling migration policy are increasingly using the criminal law as a 
tool to address the issue of migration, despite the fact that these laws are 
unlikely to have any positive public safety or security effects. 
Public safety concerns are not motivating these bills, despite 
sometimes-heated rhetoric to the contrary.
82
  Not only is the evidence fairly 
consistent that immigrants commit crimes at relatively low rates compared 
to the native born and that the presence of immigrants is negatively 
correlated with crime rates,
83
 but in jurisdictions where restrictive 
ordinances were enacted, crime rates were actually falling even as the 
unauthorized migrant population was growing.
84
  Most troublingly, in at 
least one jurisdiction, zealous enforcement of immigration laws has come at 
 
79 See id. 
80 Id. at 1649 & n.166 (discussing the restrictionist motivations behind antitrafficking 
legislation and enforcement in Georgia, Missouri, and Arizona). 
81 Juliet P. Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Rise of State and Local Power Over 
Immigration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1557, 1593 (2008). 
82 One famous example of efforts to play on fears of migrant criminality is Arizona 
Governor Jan Brewer’s now-infamous allegation that S.B. 1070 was necessary to combat 
dangerous beheadings in the Arizona desert.  Robert Farley, Beheadings, Kidnappings and 
Other Immigration Distortions, TAMPA BAY TIMES POLITIFACT.COM (Sept. 10, 2010, 3:01 
PM), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2010/sep/10/fact-checking-beheadings-
and-other-immigration/.  Arizona’s brief to the Supreme Court in favor of S.B. 1070 opens 
on the first page with an assertion that a public safety “emergency” motivated the passage of 
the bill.  Brief for Petitioners at 1, Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (No. 11-
182), 2012 WL 416748, at *1. 
83 See supra note 16. 
84 See Farley, supra note 82 (“FBI crime statistics show that violent crime fell 11 percent 
from 2004 to 2008 in Arizona.”). 
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the expense of investigations of serious and violent crimes.
85
  And many 
law enforcement officials have expressed concern that their new 
responsibilities to police migration will destroy the trust necessary to 
achieve effective community policing in their jurisdictions.
86
 
The apparent basis for using criminal law as a response to migration 
issues is the myth of migrant criminality, sometimes tinged with (or even 
steeped in) racism or nativism.  Criminal law is merely a vehicle by which 
legislators attempt to address the litany of problems that unauthorized 
migrants are purported to have caused—from alleged beheadings to school 
overcrowding to changing local culture—not only because that is the tool 
that seems more likely to avoid legal scrutiny, but also because it is the tool 
that most closely resonates with the public discourse around migration, 
which is dominated by the trope of criminality.
87
  Unfortunately, this creates 
a self-perpetuating phenomenon where migrants are increasingly subject to 
criminal law sanctions, thereby ironically validating previously unjustified 
assumptions concerning migrant criminality.
88
 
The Court’s decision in Arizona v. United States has helped to clarify 
the extent to which the Court is willing to allow states to police migration 
within their own borders.  But even before the decision was handed down in 
June 2012, many states were already taking the position that they have a 
fair amount of latitude to regulate immigration indirectly.  This trend, 
particularly in conjunction with the Court’s decision to affirm the 
constitutionality of investigations into immigration status by state and local 
law enforcement, provides legislators with ample tools to achieve 
immigration enforcement by attrition. 
These laws have other costs as well.  Recently, the Department of 
Justice has compiled reports concerning state and local policing practices 
 
85 See Marc Lacey, Sex Crimes Were Ignored, Say Reports on Sheriff, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
10, 2011, at A14 [hereinafter Sex Crimes Were Ignored] (“Sheriff Arpaio . . . is perhaps best 
known for his . . . aggressive raids aimed at illegal immigrants.  But . . . [h]is deputies failed 
to investigate or conducted only the sketchiest of inquiries into hundreds of sex crimes 
between 2005 and 2007 . . . .  Many of those cases involved molested children.”). 
86 See, e.g., J.J. Hensley, Immigration-enforcement efforts damaging to community, 
police group says, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (March 19, 2011 12:00 AM), available at 
http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/local/articles/2011/03/19/20110319immigration-
police-enforcement-weak.html (describing a report of the Police Executive Review Forum 
finding that local immigration enforcement damaged police–community trust). 
87 See Chacón, Unsecured Borders, supra note 1, at 1835–50; Ian F. Haney Lopez, Post-
Racial Racism, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1023, 1033 (2010). 
88 As previously noted, see supra note 16, earlier studies have discredited the link 
between migrants and crime.  Some have done so by looking at incarceration rates.  As 
incarceration rates of migrants soar as a result of the increased prosecution of migration 
crimes, it will become important for scholars to disaggregate the kinds of crimes for which 
migrants are incarcerated. 
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that have resulted in widespread racial profiling of Latinos.
89
  The 
discriminatory policing practices identified in these reports are often related 
to sub-federal efforts to police immigration.
90
  As states and localities 
continue to attempt to regulate immigration and to assist in federal 
immigration enforcement,
91
 it seems all but certain that these problems will 
continue to grow. 
II. INCREASED FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT 
The second maxim of immigration enforcement that has given way to 
a new reality is that the federal government does not do much to enforce the 
nation’s immigration laws.  The notion that the federal government is “not 
doing anything” or “not doing enough” to enforce federal immigration law 
has actually become something of a mantra among restrictionists, 
particularly those who have pushed for sub-federal immigration regulation 
and enforcement.
92
  As a historical matter, it is clear that the federal 
 
89 See, e.g., Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to 
Bill Montgomery, Cnty. Att’y, Maricopa Cnty. 2 (Dec. 15, 2011) [hereinafter Letter from 
Thomas E. Perez], available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/
mcso_findletter_12-15-11.pdf (“Based upon our extensive investigation, we find reasonable 
cause to believe that MCSO engages in a pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing.”); 
Mark Zaretsky, Justice Department Finds East Haven Police Department Deliberately 
Targeted Latinos, NEW HAVEN REG. (Dec. 19, 2011), http://nhregister.com/articles/
2011/12/19/news/metro/doc4eef61a24fca4049275981.txt (“The East Haven Police 
Department ‘engages in a pattern or practice of systematically discriminating against Latinos 
in violation of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution,’ U.S. Department of Justice officials 
said Monday.”). 
90 Marc Lacey, U.S. Says Arizona Sheriff Shows Pervasive Bias Against Latinos, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2011, at A1 [hereinafter Sheriff Bias] (“The report also suggested that 
Sheriff Arpaio’s well-publicized raids aimed at arresting illegal immigrants were sometimes 
prompted by complaints that described no criminal activity but referred to people with ‘dark 
skin’ or to Spanish speakers congregating in an area.  ‘The use of these types of bias-infected 
indicators as a basis for conducting enforcement activity contributes to the high number of 
stops and detentions lacking in legal justification,’ the report said.”). 
91 See discussion infra Part III. 
92 See, e.g., Dan Rivoli, Alabama Immigration Law Challenged Again: U.S. Government 
Seeks Injunction, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2011), http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/227787/
20111009/alabama-immigration-law-appeal.htm (“Alabama, along with other states 
including Georgia and Arizona, has implemented a law this year to make life for illegal 
immigrants difficult.  Supporters of these laws say they are addressing an illegal immigrant 
problem in their state created by the federal government’s inaction.”); Press Release, 
Statement by Governor Jan Brewer, Apr. 23, 2010, available at http://azgovernor.gov/
dms/upload/PR_042310_StatementByGovernorOnSB1070.pdf (“[D]ecades of federal 
inaction and misguided policy have created a dangerous and unacceptable situation.”). 
Pratheepan Gulasekaram and S. Karthick Ramakrishnan have noted that states and 
localities claiming to act because the federal government has failed to do so is the 
“conventional” explanation for sub-federal immigration regulation.  Pratheepan 
Gulasekaram & S. Karthick Ramakrishnan, Polarized Change: An Evidence-Based Theory 
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immigration agencies have not succeeded in implementing widespread 
measures to effectuate immigration enforcement.
93
  But over the past 
decade, the federal immigration enforcement apparatus has ballooned in 
size, and the effects of this expansion are widespread.  This Part first 
evaluates the rapid growth in various forms of federal enforcement efforts, 
then focuses particular attention on the rise of federal prosecutions of 
immigration crimes. 
A. THE MANY FACES OF FEDERAL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 
In fiscal year 2008, the U.S. government spent billions of dollars on 
immigration enforcement activities.
94
  Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE), the agency responsible for immigration enforcement 
activities in the interior of the country, had a budget of just over $5 
billion.
95
  Customs and Border Protection (CBP), which includes the Border 
 
of Subnational Immigration Regulation 7–10 (Jan. 28, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with the author).  It is a narrative that they ultimately discount with empirical data.  Id. at 
21–24. 
93 For this one need only look at the rise in the number of unauthorized migrants in the 
country since 1986.  In 1986, Congress enacted the Immigration Reform and Control Act, 
which authorized the legalization of millions of unauthorized migrants present in the country 
at that time.  Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 
Stat. 3359 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. (2006)).  Just under 3 
million people received lawful status as a result of the IRCA.  LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, 
supra note 9, at 1179.  To gain the support of more restrictionist members of Congress, 
IRCA also included an employer sanctions provision and enforcement mechanisms.  8 
U.S.C. § 1324a (2006).  The notion was that by drying up future employment opportunities 
for unauthorized workers, the law would stop the flow of future unauthorized workers after 
the legalization.  This did not come to pass, perhaps because the law was not vigorously 
enforced in the twenty years that followed.  See generally Michael A. Wishnie, Prohibiting 
the Employment of Unauthorized Workers: The Experiment Fails, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
193, 209–210 [hereinafter The Experiment Fails] (discussing the lax and opportunistic 
enforcement of IRCA’s employer sanctions provisions). 
Currently, there are about 11.2 million noncitizens present in the country without legal 
authorization.  JEFFREY S. PASSEL & D’VERA COHN, PEW HISPANIC CTR., UNAUTHORIZED 
IMMIGRANT POPULATION: NATIONAL AND STATE TRENDS, 2010, at 1 (2011), available at 
http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/reports/133.pdf.  This number has declined slightly in 
recent years, largely as a result of the faltering U.S. economy.  COMM. ON LAW AND JUSTICE, 
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, BUDGETING FOR IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: A PATH TO 
BETTER PERFORMANCE 32–34 (Steve Redburn et al. eds., 2011) [hereinafter BUDGETING FOR 
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT] (finding that immigration enforcement efforts had very little 
measurable impact on migration flows and that the downturn in the U.S. economy appears to 
account for most of the decrease in flow in recent years). 
94 I discussed the expansion of federal enforcement expenditures previously, in Jennifer 
M. Chacón, A Diversion of Attention? Immigration Courts and the Adjudication of Fourth 
and Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE L.J. 1563, 1571–72 (2010).  I borrow directly from 
that discussion in this paragraph. 
95 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., BUDGET-IN-BRIEF: FISCAL YEAR 2008, at 19 (2008), 
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Patrol, as well as other enforcement agencies focusing on the flow of goods 
and people across the U.S. borders, had a budget of just over $10 billion,
96
 
bringing the combined total operating budgets for the two to over $15 
billion in fiscal year 2008.  By way of comparison, in 1998, the budget for 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) was just over $3.6 
billion.
97
  This figure includes immigration services that are now provided 
by Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) and are not included in the 
$15 billion figure above.  Additionally, although these budget figures 
reflect DHS spending on investigations, prosecutions, detention, and 
removal, they do not reflect all of the federal costs of immigration 
enforcement, given the costs of prosecuting and punishing immigration 
crimes in criminal courts.  Even so, the $15 billion budget for ICE and CBP 
represents a five-fold budget increase in the past decade, and the budget is 
more than fifteen times what it was in 1988.
98
 
Another significant transformation in immigration enforcement is in 
the rise of immigration detention.
99
  Largely as a result of mandatory 
detention provisions enacted by Congress in 1996,
100
 the vast majority of 
those arrested for immigration offenses are detained as they await trial or 
removal proceedings.  Strikingly, although 81% of those charged with drug-
trafficking offenses are detained after arrest and 87% of those charged with 
violent crimes are detained after arrest, a full 95% of those who have 
committed immigration crimes (which are largely nonviolent and most 
often misdemeanors) are detained upon arrest.
101
  Given the significant rise 
in the number of immigration arrests over the past decade, this practice of 
 
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/budget_bib-fy2008.pdf. 
96 Id. 
97 An Overview of Federal Drug Control Programs on the Southwest Border: 
Immigration and Naturalization Service, OFF. NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POL’Y, 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/ondcppubs/publications/enforce/border/ins_3.html (last visited Dec. 9, 
2012). 
98 JUSTICE MGMT. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUDGET TREND DATA: FROM 1975 
THROUGH THE PRESIDENT’S 2003 REQUEST TO THE CONGRESS 104–08 (2002) [hereinafter 
BUDGET TREND DATA], available at http://www.justice.gov/archive/jmd/1975_2002/2002/
pdf/BudgetTrand.pdf (showing budget trends for INS from 1975 to 2003 and recording an 
INS budget of $1.01 billion in 1988). 
99 The next two paragraphs draw from my discussion of these issues in A Diversion of 
Attention?, supra note 94, at 1577–78. 
100 See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), 
Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 303(a), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-585 (codified as amended at 8 
U.S.C. § 1226(c)); see also Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 513 (2003) (upholding the 
mandatory detention provisions); Margaret Taylor, Demore v. Kim: Judicial Deference to 
Congressional Folly, in IMMIGRATION STORIES 343, 348–54 (David A. Martin & Peter H. 
Schuck eds., 2005) (describing the enactment of these provisions and critiquing their 
overbreadth). 
101 FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2009, supra note 5, at 1. 
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detaining most arrestees has generated an explosion in immigration 




Regarding the immigration detention landscape, Anil Kalhan recently 
observed, “[i]n 1994, officials held approximately 6,000 noncitizens in 
detention on any given day.  That daily average had surpassed 20,000 
individuals by 2001 and 33,000 by 2008.  Over the same period, the overall 
number of individuals detained each year has swelled from approximately 
81,000 to approximately 380,000.”103  Although civil immigration detention 
technically is not a part of the criminal justice system, as a practical matter, 
many noncitizens in immigration detention in fact are housed in county 
jails, and even those detained in separate facilities are subject to the same 
kinds of punitive detention as criminal defendants.  Indeed, a 2009 report 
by Dora Schriro, then a senior Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
official, found that immigration detainees are held under circumstances that 
are unjustifiably punitive given the noncriminal purposes of immigration 
detention.
104
  Thus, it is important to take the civil detention of nearly 
400,000 noncitizens into account when contemplating the extent to which 
immigration has been criminalized in recent years. 
Another measure of the growth in federal enforcement efforts can be 
found in the physical space along the U.S.–Mexico border, which has 
become increasingly militarized during this period.  CBP now operates six 
Predator drones along the border.
105
  For a time, and in a move that further 
obfuscates the total dollars being spent on immigration enforcement, 1,200 
 
102 See Christopher Nugent, Towards Balancing a New Immigration and Nationality Act: 
Enhanced Immigration Enforcement and Fair, Humane and Cost-Effective Treatment of 
Aliens, 5 U. MD. L.J. RACE RELIGION GENDER & CLASS 243, 254–55 & n.46 (2005) 
(discussing state, local, and private fiscal benefits of immigration detention); Nina Bernstein, 
City of Immigrants Fills Jail Cells with Its Own, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2008, at A1 (reporting 
on illusory nature of fiscal benefits for localities but ample benefits for private contractors); 
Nina Bernstein, Getting Tough on Immigrants to Turn a Profit, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2011, 
at A1 (discussing financial benefits accruing to private immigration detention contractors 
globally).  Since federal arrests constitute only 1% of total arrests made, see MARK 
MOLTIVANS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL JUSTICE 
STATISTICS 2009 (2011), available at www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs09.pdf, it comes as no 
surprise that private companies in the detention industry have actively promoted state-level 
immigration legislation.  See Laura Sullivan & Beau Hodai, How Corporate Interests Got SB 
1070 Passed (NPR broadcast Nov. 9, 2010), transcript available at http://www.npr.org/
2010/11/09/131191523/how-corporate-interests-got-sb-1070-passed. 
103 Kalhan, supra note 13, at 44–45. 
104 DORA SCHRIRO, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION DETENTION OVERVIEW 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 10, 15 (2009). 
105 U.S. Adds Surveillance Drone on Mexico Border, REUTERS (Dec. 27, 2011), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/27/us-usa-mexico-drone-idUSTRE7BQ17220111
227. 
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National Guard members were also stationed along the border.
106
  President 
Obama recently reduced that number by 300, but this costly intervention 
continues.
107
  The only major piece of immigration legislation that Congress 
was able to agree on in the past decade was a bill to build 700 miles of 
fencing along the southern border with Mexico, notwithstanding the 
evidence that the costs of the project—in terms of dollars, the environment, 
private property rights, and human lives—would outweigh any measureable 
benefits in the reduction of unauthorized migration.
108
 
Increased federal enforcement efforts have resulted in a huge increase 
in the number of noncitizens removed from the country each year.  As a 
result of these efforts, the number of individuals removed from the United 
States annually has increased significantly—from about 18,000 in 1980 to 
about 30,000 in 1990 to about 188,000 in 2000, and reaching a record high 
of about 392,000 in 2011 (the most recent year for which official statistics 
are available).
109
  Of course, if individuals were simply removed, it might 
be easy to exempt these individuals from a discussion of 
overcriminalization.  But noncitizens caught up in expanded removal efforts 
are not simply pushed through an administrative system and removed.  A 
significant and growing number of them are subjected to federal criminal 
prosecution.
110
 The following Subpart discusses and critiques the 
 
106 National Guard Forces to Be Cut at Southern Border, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2011, at 
A29. 
107 See id. 
108 See, e.g., CHAD C. HADDAL ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33659, BORDER 
SECURITY: BARRIERS ALONG THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL BORDER 26–27 (2009), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33659.pdf (estimating the cost of the border fence at 
more than $16.4 million to $70 million per mile over the projected twenty-five-year life of 
the fence and questioning whether the barrier would even be effective at reducing 
unauthorized migration). 
109 DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2011 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 102 (2012), 
available at http://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics.  Notably, the number of people 
“returned” (which would include not only noncitizens who were removed, but also those 
noncitizens—often stopped near the border or its functional equivalent—who leave the 
United States without formal process or otherwise departed “voluntarily” in the absence of a 
removal order) has actually fallen in recent years.  From a record high of 1.676 million in 
2000, that number was 323,542 in 2011, id., suggesting a preference on the part of the past 
two administrations to remove noncitizens through the issuance of a formal removal order 
that will serve as a permanent disability in a noncitizen’s future efforts to reenter. 
110 Many individuals removed by the federal government also entered the process 
through the states’ criminal justice systems, and their immigration status played a significant 
role in the processing and disposition of their criminal cases.  See generally Ingrid V. Eagly, 
Criminal Justice for Noncitizens: An Analysis of Variations in Local Enforcement, 88 
N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (discussing the variable ways in which immigration 
status affects the criminal process experienced by noncitizens in three different 
jurisdictions).  The interplay between sub-federal criminal justice systems and the 
immigration system is considered further infra Part III. 
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tremendous increase in federal immigration prosecutions. 
B. PROSECUTING FEDERAL IMMIGRATION CRIMES 
The growth of federal immigration enforcement efforts is manifested 
clearly in the rise in prosecutions of immigration crimes.
111
  In 1993, the 
number of suspects in matters received by U.S. Attorneys’ Offices for  
immigration offenses was 5,934,
112
 of whom 5,400 were prosecuted or 
disposed of by a magistrate.
113
  This was only 5.4% of the total number of 
cases investigated in that year.
114
  In these records, immigration offenses are 
listed as a subcategory of “[o]ther” “[p]ublic-order” offenses. 
The effects of the draconian 1996 changes in the immigration laws
115
 
were felt in the years that followed.  By 2000, the number of individuals 
investigated for immigration offenses was 16,495.
116
  This was only 13.4% 
of the total number of cases investigated in that year.
117
  Interestingly, this 
was so even though the INS made 33% of the arrests made by federal 
officers in that year,
118
 suggesting that in many cases individuals who were 
arrested by the INS were either not investigated or, presumably in a few 
cases, were prosecuted for other, more serious offenses.  In these records, 
immigration offenses continue to be listed as a subcategory of “[o]ther” 
“[p]ublic-order” offenses.119 
But the true explosion in criminal immigration enforcement came in 
the years following the September 11th attacks.  Once the INS had been 
reorganized into three separate agencies under the auspices of the DHS and 
the money for immigration enforcement began pouring in, arrests and 
prosecutions for immigration crimes skyrocketed.  This trend has continued 
year after year, no matter who is in the White House and who controls 
 
111 I discussed this trend in some detail in Jennifer M. Chacón, Managing Migration 
Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 135, 139 (2009), 
http://www.columbialawreview.org/assets/sidebar/volume/109/135_Chacon.pdf.  I borrow 
from that discussion in this Subpart. 
112 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, 1993, at 15 (1996), available at bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/
cfjs93.pdf. 
113 Id. at 15–16. 
114 Id. 
115 See supra notes 13 & 100 and accompanying text. 
116 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2000, at 1 (2002), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?
ty=pbdetail&iid=605. 
117 Id. at 1 (indicating that U.S. Attorneys initiated investigations in 123,559 cases in 
2000, and that 16,495 of those involved immigration offenses). 
118 Id. at 1. 
119 Id. at 27. 
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Congress. 
With regard to arrests, the Bureau of Justice Statistics recently 
recorded that “[b]etween 2005 and 2009, immigration arrests increased at 
an annual average rate of 23%,” and that “[i]mmigration offenses (46%) 
were the most common of all arrest offenses in 2009, followed by drug 
(17%) and supervision (13%) violations.”120  The government is now 
arresting more than twice as many people annually as it did in 1995, and the 
bulk of that increase is the result of increased immigration arrests 
originating with DHS officials.
121
 
At present, the number of immigration convictions occurring each 
month outstrips the annual total of immigration prosecutions in 1993.
122
  
This is not a deviation, but has been the norm for several years.
123
  Between 
mid-2008 and September 2011, conviction rates were almost always in 




Immigration prosecutions take many forms.  Until recently, by far the 
most numerous were for simple misdemeanor illegal entry.
125
  Obtaining a 
conviction for this crime simply requires the prosecutor to establish that an 
individual entered the country without inspection or evaded inspection.
126
  
A typical case might involve a person who crossed the border away from a 
formal port of entry.  No particular mens rea is required for a conviction of 
entry without inspection,
127
 although the law also contains a provision for 
the prosecution of those who “willfully” conceal a material fact or make 




120 FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2009, supra note 5, at 1. 
121 See id. at 1, fig.1. 
122 Compare Immigration Convictions for September 2011, TRAC IMMIGRATION (Dec. 
14, 2011), http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/bulletins/immigration/monthlysep11/gui/ 
[hereinafter Immigration Convictions for September 2011] (placing the number of 
immigration prosecutions in September 2011 at 6,055, and noting that this number is 
actually a decrease from the previous month), with supra text accompanying note 113. 
123 See Immigration Convictions for September 2011, supra note 122, at fig.1.  As this 
Article goes to press, more recent data suggests that immigration prosecutions peaked early 
in 2011 and have declined since that time, although the numbers are still at historic highs.  
Decline in Federal Criminal Immigration Prosecutions, TRAC IMMIGRATION (June 12, 
2012), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/283/. 
124 Immigration Convictions for September 2011, supra note 122, at fig.1. 
125 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (2006); see Illegal Reentry Becomes Top Criminal Charge, TRAC 
IMMIGRATION (June 10, 2011), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/251/ (noting that 2011 
was “the first year that recorded prosecutions for illegal reentry surpassed those of illegal 
entry, which have been declining from their high during FY 2009”). 
126 See § 1325(a). 
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
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In 2009, two-thirds of the individuals prosecuted for immigration 
crimes were “disposed by U.S. magistrates as petty misdemeanants in . . . 
five Southwest border districts.”129  The rote prosecution of illegal entrants 
created a huge distortion in some dockets.
130
  The prosecution of illegal 
entry along the southern border consumed resources that courts might 
otherwise have used to combat violent crime.
131
  Magistrate judges have 
typically handled these cases in proceedings in which mass plea agreements 
are obtained.
132
  These proceedings fall well short of the kind of procedural 
protections generally given to a defendant taking a criminal plea.
133
  Indeed, 
the Ninth Circuit has concluded that these en masse plea agreements violate 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11.
134
  Unfortunately, individual 
defendants in that case—and many others—are without a remedy because 
they are unable to show prejudice. 
Until recently, the second most common group of prosecutions was for 
felony reentry, but in 2011, felony reentry prosecutions actually exceeded 
prosecutions for misdemeanor entry.
135
  “From 2001 to 2008, 111,920 
[noncitizens] were prosecuted for the crime [of illegal re-entry] . . . .  
Obama’s administration is averaging about 34,355 annually and is on pace 
to surpass 103,000 in his first three years.”136  The surge in felony reentry 
prosecutions is no surprise.  Since millions of noncitizens have been 
formally removed in recent years, if even a small percentage of those 
individuals with strong ties to the United States attempt to return during the 
period in which their return is barred,
137
 this will cause a surge in felony 
 
129 FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2009, supra note 5, at 5. 
130 Ted Robbins, Claims of Border Program Success Are Unproven (NPR broadcast 
Sept. 13, 2010), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?story
Id=129827870. 
131 Id. 
132 See Chacón, Managing Migration, supra note 1, at 142–43; see also JOANNA 
LYDGATE, CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN INST. ON RACE, ETHNICITY & DIVERSITY, BERKELEY 
LAW SCHOOL, ASSEMBLY-LINE JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF OPERATION STREAMLINE 1–2 (2010), 
available at www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Operation_Streamline_Policy_Brief.pdf. 
133 Chacón, Managing Migration, supra note 1, at 145–47. 
134 United States v. Roblero-Solis, 588 F.3d 692, 693 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The problem 
generated by the massive caseload on the court understandably led the court to adopt a 
shortcut.  Abstractly considered, the shortcut is not only understandable but reasonable.  The 
shortcut, however, does not comply with Rule 11.  We cannot permit this rule to be 
disregarded in the name of efficiency nor be violated because it is too demanding for the 
district court to observe.”). 
135 Julian Aguilar, Illegal Re-entry Cases Surge Under Obama, TEX. TRIB. (June 15, 
2011), http://www.texastribune.org/texas-mexico-border-news/texas-mexico-border/illegal-
reentry-cases-surge-under-obama/. 
136 Id.; see also Immigration Convictions for September 2011, supra note 122. 
137 An individual who is removed from the U.S. is generally barred from reentering for 
five years, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(i) (2006), although that bar stretches to ten years for 
638 JENNIFER M. CHACÓN [Vol. 102 
reentry.  And at least some portion of the tens of thousands of border 
crossers who were prosecuted for illegal entry are attempting to reenter—
except that now, their entry is a felony by virtue of their prior conviction.  
One thing that the number of felony reentry prosecutions makes clear is that 
many noncitizens are not deterred from returning by their past detentions or 
by the threat of future detention or criminal incarceration.
138
 
As with the misdemeanor entry cases, felony reentry cases are often 
resolved through plea agreements.  Unless the initial removal was invalid, 
there are few grounds upon which a defendant can successfully contest this 
charge, which carries a potential sentence of up to twenty years.
139
  Very 
few defendants receive twenty-year sentences, but what is striking about 
these prosecutions is how varied the sentences are.  For defendants in “Fast-
Track” jurisdictions, pleas of two to three years are not uncommon, while 
those who by happenstance are detained and tried in other areas (where 
perhaps the pressure of immigration cases on the docket is less of a 
problem), the sentences tend to be substantially longer, regardless of the 
underlying offenses—if any—that led to the initial removal.140  The 
irrationality of federal sentencing for reentry crimes suggests a much deeper 
lack of consensus over the seriousness of the offense and the degree to 
which such sentences serve as a general deterrent to illegal entry and 
reentry.  As with drug crimes, heavy sentences do not seem to be tethered to 
any kind of factual analysis aimed at determining the optimal use of 
criminal sanctions to achieve enforcement goals. 
The remainder of prosecutions for immigration offenses constitutes an 
extremely small portion of the overall prosecutions.  Charges for alien 
smuggling, human trafficking, and immigration-related fraud are few and 
far between.
141
  Criminal prosecutions of employers who have violated 
 
anyone who has been present without authorization for a year or more, 
§ 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II). 
138 See also BUDGETING FOR IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT, supra note 93, at 34, 118 
(concluding that increased reliance on criminal prosecutions had little deterrent effect on 
unauthorized migrants). 
139 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (2006). 
140 Alison Siegler, Disparities and Discretion in Fast-Track Sentencing, 21 FED. SENT’G 
REP. 299, 299 (2009). 
141 Data from January 2012 is illustrative.  The top-ranked immigration charge in federal 
district court in that month was illegal reentry, 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2006), numbering 1,477, 
while the next highest number of prosecutions for alien smuggling and harboring, § 1324, 
numbered only 166, and all additional charges were in the double or single digits.  See 
Immigration Prosecutions for January 2012, TRAC IMMIGRATION (Apr. 19, 2012), 
http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/bulletins/immigration/monthlyjan12/fil/.  That same month, in 
the magistrate courts, the most frequently cited lead charge was misdemeanor illegal entry, 
§ 1325, which was the lead charge for 56.8% of the 6,069 defendants in immigration cases 
filed before magistrates that month, with felony reentry, § 1326, comprising 37.9%—almost 
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IRCA’s criminal provisions are rare.142  The bulk of prosecutorial resources 
are aimed not at those who prey on or profit from the migrants, but on the 
migrants themselves. 
In short, the past fifteen years have witnessed a massive expansion of 
federal resources dedicated to immigration enforcement, an unprecedented 
militarization of the southern border, an exponential increase in the number 
of noncitizens held in detention, and a more than twelve-fold increase in the 
number of criminal immigration prosecutions.  Yet, as previously noted, the 
mantra that the federal government is not enforcing immigration law is still 
frequently invoked in the national dialogue concerning immigration.  Given 
the tremendous cost of this endeavor—and given that many of these 
expenses have come at a time when so many other federal programs are 
being asked to cut back or slow growth—it is not clear exactly what would 
appease those who call for ever more vigorous enforcement of immigration 
laws. 
Reviewing the figures concerning federal enforcement efforts and 
federal prosecutions of immigration crimes reveals a very different problem 
from the one that has been the rallying cry of restrictionists.  The federal 
government is enforcing immigration law.  It is enforcing immigration law 
as never before and is relying on the criminal justice system in an 
unprecedented way to do so.  The question is: do these enforcement efforts 
make sense?  Or do they constitute an overcriminalization of migration, the 
costs of which are difficult to justify when weighed against any cost savings 
(if indeed there are costs savings) achieved by reducing the number of 
unauthorized workers present within our borders?  The data suggests that 
this use of the criminal justice system is having, at best, a marginal effect 
on migration flows, and may be having no impact at all.
143
 
Unfortunately, this is not the question that the immigration debate is  
focused upon, but it is an important question.  For even as the federal 
 
all of the remaining immigration cases.  Id. 
142 ANDORRA BRUNO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40002, IMMIGRATION-RELATED 
WORKSITE ENFORCEMENT: PERFORMANCE MEASURES 8 (2012), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R40002.pdf (noting that there were only 196 criminal 
arrests of managerial employees in connection with workplace hiring violations, and noting 
that “ICE . . . criminal arrests in worksite enforcement operations represent a very small 
percentage of the potential population of violators”); see also Wishnie, The Experiment 
Fails, supra note 93 at 209–11.  For arguments that employer sanctions are harmful to 
workers and should be abolished, see Bill Ong Hing, Asian Americans and Immigration 
Reform, 17 ASIAN AM. L.J. 83, 104 (2010) (“The rationale for employer sanctions always has 
been that the law would dry up jobs for the undocumented and discourage them from 
coming.  However, a close look at ICE raids reveals that employer sanctions have had 
disastrous effects on all workers.”); Wishnie, The Experiment Fails, supra note 93, at 214–
17. 
143 BUDGETING FOR IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT, supra note 93, at 34. 
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government ramps up its enforcement effort, it is being joined by a number 
of force multipliers in the form of state and local law enforcement agencies 
that are now expending some of their own resources to enforce federal 
immigration laws. 
III. DECLINING FEDERAL EXCLUSIVITY IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF 
IMMIGRATION LAWS 
Throughout the twentieth century, the federal government assumed an 
almost exclusive role not merely in the legal regulation of migration, as 
previously noted, but also in the enforcement of immigration law.
144
  This is 
not to suggest that states and localities have played no role in immigration 
enforcement.  On the contrary, during the twentieth century, state and local 
governments participated in a number of high-profile attempts to rid their 
borders of individuals who were (or were perceived to be) undocumented.  
For example, local officials actively participated in the “repatriation” of 
Mexicans—and many Mexican-Americans—during the 1930s.145  And in 
 
144 Chin & Miller, supra note 46, at 273–74 (reviewing existing precedent as standing for 
the proposition that “[t]he federal government has exclusive authority not only to establish 
the standards for the admission and exclusion of immigrants, but also to apply and enforce 
them” (emphasis added)); Wishnie, supra note 11, at 1089 (“[A]lthough individual police 
officials have occasionally directed their departments to enforce immigration laws, on the 
whole, enforcement of the immigration statutes has traditionally been the province of federal 
immigration officials.” (footnote omitted)).  Indeed, reviewing history and precedent, 
Wishnie and others have concluded that sub-federal enforcement of civil immigration law by 
local officials is unconstitutional.  See id. at 1089 (“Nor may this constitutional power to 
regulate immigration be devolved by statute or executive decree to state or local authorities, 
because the federal immigration power is ‘incapable of transfer’ and ‘cannot be granted 
away.’” (citations omitted)); id. at 1090 n.35 (citing scholarly work); see also Huyen Pham, 
The Inherent Flaws in the Inherent Authority Position: Why Inviting Local Enforcement of 
Immigration Laws Violates the Constitution, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 965, 995–96 (2004) 
(arguing that local enforcement of immigration law is inherently unconstitutional). 
145 See FRANCISCO E. BALDERRAMA & RAYMOND RODRIGUEZ, DECADE OF BETRAYAL: 
MEXICAN REPATRIATION IN THE 1930S, at 119–59 (rev. ed. 2006).  During the 1930s, 
hundreds of thousands of Mexicans (and U.S. citizens of Mexican descent) were 
“repatriated” to Mexico.  Balderrama and Rodriguez estimate the number to be about 1 
million, with 400,000 leaving from California alone.  Id. at 151, 305.  The term 
“repatriation” is misleading for two reasons.  First, it suggests a voluntary movement, when 
in fact, much of the relocation was generated by legal coercion by federal, state, and local 
actors, in connection with threats of violence and virulent discrimination by private actors.  
Id. at 119–59, 305.  Second, it suggests that those being “repatriated” were returning to their 
native land—a situation that was not the case for the many U.S. citizens of Mexican ancestry 
who were sent to Mexico during this time.  Kevin R. Johnson, The Forgotten “Repatriation” 
of Persons of Mexican Ancestry and Lessons for the “War on Terror,” 26 PACE L. REV. 1, 
4–5 (2005) (estimating that 60% of the “repatriated” Mexicans were U.S. citizens); see also 
BALDERRAMA & RODRIGUEZ, supra, at 307–08 (giving examples of citizen children caught 
up in the “repatriation” movement).  State and local governments were active participants in 
the campaign, using coercion and physical force to achieve the removal of Mexicans and 
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the course of the federally orchestrated immigration policing action known 
as “Operation Wetback,” local governments acted in cooperation with the 
federal government in detaining undocumented noncitizens—as well as 
U.S. citizens of Mexican descent and Mexican migrants lawfully present—
and removing them to Mexico.
146
 
In spite of the frequent interventions on the part of state and local 
actors in immigration enforcement, formal legal authority for such 
interventions did not exist.  One might argue that the power to enforce 
federal immigration law is an inherent power of state and local law 
enforcement, but throughout the past century, neither the existing case law 
nor existing scholarly theories supported this conclusion.  Indeed, in 
response to confusion on the point, the Department of Justice issued a 1996 
memorandum outlining the limits of state and local authority to enforce 
immigration laws as these limits were understood at the time.
147
  The 
memorandum concluded that “[s]tate and local police lack recognized legal 
authority to stop and detain an alien solely on suspicion of civil 
deportability, as opposed to a criminal violation of the immigration laws or 
other laws.”148  On the other hand, the memorandum also concluded that 
“state and local police may constitutionally detain or arrest aliens for 
violating the criminal provisions of the Immigration and Naturalization 
Act.”149  In short, the federal position was that a state or local police officer 
had the authority to conduct arrests for immigration crimes such as felony 
reentry or alien smuggling, but not for the civil offense of being present in 
the country without current legal authorization.  And even when the state 
had the power to arrest an immigration violator, there was no basis to 
prosecute that person for immigration violations at the state level.
150
  This 
task—as well as the task of removing that person from the country—
remained the sole province of the federal government. 
 
Mexican-Americans.  Id. at 305; Johnson, supra, at 4–5.  This was true notwithstanding the 
constitutional obstacles to this sub-federal immigration enforcement.  Johnson, supra, at 9–
10.  (“Through efforts to enforce the immigration laws, state and local governments also 
infringed on the federal immigration power.”). 
146 JUAN RAMON GARCIA, OPERATION WETBACK: THE MASS DEPORTATION OF MEXICAN 
UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS IN 1954, at 183–202 (1980) (discussing the cooperation of many 
California and some Arizona officials, and opposition from Texas officials). 
147 Assistance by State and Local Police in Apprehending Illegal Aliens, 20 Op. O.L.C.  
26, 32 (1996) [hereinafter Apprehending Illegal Aliens], available at http://www.justice.gov/
olc/immstopo1a.htm; see also NAT’L IMMIGRATION FORUM, BACKGROUNDER: IMMIGRATION 
LAW ENFORCEMENT BY STATE AND LOCAL POLICE 1 (2004), available at 
http://www.immigrationforum.org/images/uploads/Backgrounder-
StateLocalEnforcement.pdf (discussing the Office of Legal Counsel memo). 
148 Apprehending Illegal Aliens, supra note 147. 
149 Id. at 27. 
150 Chin & Miller, supra note 46, at 312–14. 
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In two major pieces of legislation enacted in 1996, Congress expanded 
the power of state and local law enforcement to enforce federal immigration 
law in three specific ways.
151
  First, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act (AEDPA) formally authorized sub-federal law enforcement 
officers to arrest and detain unlawfully present noncitizens who had 
“previously been convicted of a felony in the United States.”152  Second, the 
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) 
empowered the Attorney General
153
 to authorize local officials to enforce 
civil immigration laws when “an actual or imminent mass influx of 
aliens . . . presents urgent circumstances requiring an immediate Federal 
response.”154  Finally, IIRIRA added § 287(g) to the Immigration and 
Nationality Act to allow the Attorney General to delegate immigration 
enforcement authority to state and local police pursuant to a formal 
agreement between the state or local agency and the Department of Justice, 
provided the state or local officers have undergone adequate training to 
enforce the immigration laws.
155
  Such agreements, now increasingly 
common, are often referred to as “287(g) agreements.”156  None of these 
provisions would have been necessary if state and local governments 
actually had “inherent authority” to enforce immigration laws, which 
suggests that Congress did not believe that they did. 
In 2002, the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) under Attorney General 
John Ashcroft revised the 1996 memorandum regarding the role of state and 
local police in immigration enforcement, concluding that state and local law 
enforcement had “inherent authority” to arrest and detain immigration 
violators, including civil immigration violators.
157
  Although the OLC 
memo was not immediately released, this new policy—which contravened 
 
151 NAT’L IMMIGRATION FORUM, supra note 147, at 3, 5.  I have previously traced the 
sub-federalization of immigration enforcement developments in Chacón, supra note 27, at 
Part I.A and Chacón, supra note 94, at 1579–98, and I draw from those discussions 
throughout the remainder of this Subpart. 
152 Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 439(a), 110 Stat. 1214, 1276 (1996) (codified at 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(c) (2006)). 
153 This responsibility now falls to the Secretary of the Department of Homeland 
Security.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1), (10) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010). 
154 Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 303(a), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-646 (codified as amended at 
8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)). 
155 See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2006). 
156 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Secretary Napolitano 
Announces New Agreement for State and Local Immigration Enforcement Partnerships & 
Adds 11 New Agreements (July 10, 2009) [hereinafter Dept. of Homeland Sec. Press 
Release], available at http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/pr_1247246453625.shtm. 
157 Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, to the Att’y Gen. (Apr. 3, 2002), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/
FilesPDFs/ACF27DA.pdf. 
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conventional scholarly opinion and prior legal opinions—created a new 
source of confusion concerning the scope of state and local power to 
enforce immigration law. 
Given leeway, some law enforcement agencies began asserting 
“inherent authority” to conduct arrests to effectuate both federal civil and 
criminal immigration laws.
158
  Although this position is difficult to 
reconcile with the narrow and specific congressional grants of power to 
states and localities in the 1996 legislation, the notion has gained a 
surprising degree of currency in recent years.
159
  As a consequence, state 
and local law enforcement are engaged in policing immigration at 
unprecedented levels, sometimes without the express authority of the 
federal government.
160
  Compounding this trend is the necessary 
involvement of state and local officials in enforcing the sub-federal 
immigration laws enacted in their jurisdictions.
161
  Arizona’s S.B. 1070 and 
similar state laws have attempted to expand the states’ ability to participate 
in and, indeed, to shape and define the parameters of local immigration 
enforcement through the use of their own criminal and licensing laws.
162
 
At the same time that the federal government has sought to rein in 
 
158 See, e.g., Penny Starr, Sheriff Arpaio’s Office is Only Law Enforcement Agency in 
U.S. Denied Authority to Enforce Immigration Laws, Says DHS, CNS NEWS (Oct. 22, 2009), 
http://cnsnews.com/news/article/sheriff-arpaios-office-only-law-enforcement-agency-us-
denied-authority-enforce (reporting Sheriff Joe Arpaio’s statement that he would continue to 
enforce immigration law even if not authorized to do so by a 287(g) agreement, and citing to 
Kris Kobach’s argument, relying on the 2002 OLC memo, see supra note 157, that Arpaio 
was entitled to do so).  The legality and legitimacy of these enforcement efforts have been 
challenged by the Justice Department.  See Letter from Thomas E. Perez, supra note 89, at 3 
(“Our investigation uncovered a number of instances in which immigration-related crime 
suppression activities were initiated in the community after [the Maricopa County Sherriff’s 
Office] received complaints that described no criminal activity, but rather referred, for 
instance, to individuals with ‘dark skin’ congregating in one area, or individuals speaking 
Spanish at a local business.  The use of these types of bias-infected indicators as a basis for 
conducting enforcement activity contributes to the high number of stops and detentions 
lacking in legal justification.”).  The Department has found similar problems with the East 
Haven, Connecticut, Police Department—another department that engages in immigration 
policing in the absence of a 287(g) agreement.  See Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant 
Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Joseph Maturo, Jr., Mayor of East Haven at 9 (Dec. 
19, 2011), available at www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/easthaven_findletter_12-
19-11.pdf (“EHPD does not have . . . a ‘287(g) agreement[].’  Nonetheless, EHPD has 
allowed its officers to engage in haphazard and uncoordinated immigration enforcement 
efforts to target Latino drivers for traffic stops.”).  It is impossible to know just how many 
jurisdictions are engaged in such practices, but clearly such practices are ongoing in some 
jurisdictions. 
159 Chin & Miller, supra note 46, at 255–56. 
160 See Starr, supra note 158. 
161 See supra Part I. 
162 Supra Part I.C. 
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states and localities in their immigration enforcement efforts,
163
 the federal 
government has also come to rely on state and local law enforcement agents 
in conducting its own, newly expanded enforcement efforts.
164
  As 
previously noted, 1996 legislation empowered the federal government to 
enter into contractual arrangements with sub-federal entities to enforce 
immigration laws.
165
  Although the federal government did not begin 
entering into such agreements in the 1990s, it did so throughout the last 
decade, and currently has contractual agreements with fifty-seven law 
enforcement agencies in twenty-one states.
166
  Depending on the scope of 
the agreements, state and local officials in these jurisdictions can do 
anything from screen the immigration status of jail inmates
167
 to conduct 
arrests for federal immigration violations.
168
  Critics contending that the 
federal government failed to sufficiently train and oversee state and local 
agents in implementing these agreements were vindicated when a 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) report essentially concluded just 
that.
169
  As a result, agents were engaging in racial profiling and other 
impermissible tactics in policing immigration.  Since the GAO report was 
issued, the Obama administration has increased oversight and training and 
reduced the number of 287(g) agreements, although critics contend that the 





163 See discussion of the federal lawsuits in Arizona and Alabama at notes 50–54, supra. 
164 For a discussion of the tension in these policies, see Julianne Hing, Justice Dept. 
Finally Cuffs Sheriff Joe, But Not the Policy That Made Him, COLORLINES (Jan. 5, 2012, 
9:54 AM), http://colorlines.com/archives/2012/01/sheriff_joe_will_cooperate_with_doj_
cleanup_issues_demands_of_his_own.html. 
165 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2006); see supra text accompanying notes 155–57. 
166 Fact Sheet: Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and 
Nationality Act, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/news/
library/factsheets/287g.htm#signed-moa (last visited Nov. 28, 2012). 
167 See, e.g., Memorandum of Agreement between U.S. Immigration & Customs 
Enforcement and the Arizona Dep’t of Corr. (Oct. 15, 2009), available at 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/memorandumsofAgreementUnderstanding/r_287gazdeptofco
rrections101509.pdf. 
168 See, e.g., Memorandum of Agreement between U.S. Immigration & Customs 
Enforcement and Springdale Police Dep’t (Oct. 15, 2009), available at http://www.ice.gov/
doclib/foia/memorandumsofAgreementUnderstanding/r_287gspringdalepd101509.pdf. 
169 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: BETTER 
CONTROLS NEEDED OVER PROGRAM AUTHORIZING STATE AND LOCAL ENFORCEMENT OF 
FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAWS 4–7, 10–19 (2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d09109.pdf. 
170 For a brief discussion by the Department of Homeland Security concerning its own 
efforts to reform the program, see Dept. of Homeland Sec. Press Release, supra note 156.  
For an example of continued criticism from immigrants’ rights organizations in response to 
these reforms, see, for example, ICE Reforms Fail to Solve Fundamental 287(g) Problems, 
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Moreover, the federal government has not simply invited state and 
local participation in immigration enforcement.  With the rollout of the 
Secure Communities program, the federal government has mandated the 
participation of state and local officials in federal immigration enforcement.  
Pursuant to the Secure Communities program, Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) screens the biometric information gathered by state and 
local law-enforcement to identify noncitizens in state prisons and local jails 
who are potentially subject to removal.  As of August 22, 2012, the 
biometric-information-sharing capability of the Secure Communities 
program is active in “3,074 jurisdictions in 50 states, 4 territories and 
Washington D.C.”171  In these jurisdictions, any individual who is arrested 
has his identifying information run through the Department of Homeland 
Security’s database so that the federal government can determine whether 
the individual is in violation of immigration laws.  If an individual is 
deemed to be an immigration law violator, ICE may authorize the local 
agency to detain that individual for up to forty-eight hours, at which time 




The Secure Communities program has generated a number of 
concerns.  First, inaccuracies in the DHS database have resulted in a 
number of false arrests, including the arrest and detention of U.S. citizens 
and noncitizens lawfully present.
173
  Early studies of the Secure 
Communities program also suggest that discriminatory policing of Latinos 
has tended to increase in certain jurisdictions when they begin their 
 
NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CTR. (Apr. 2010), http://www.nilc.org/287g-OIG-report-2010-04-29.html. 
171 U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, ACTIVATED JURISDICTION 1 (August 
22, 2012), available at www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/sc-activated.pdf. 
172 See Secure Communities: Frequently Asked Questions, How Does Secure 
Communities Work?, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS 
ENFORCEMENT,  http://www.ice.gov/secure_communities/faq.htm (last visited June 4, 2012) 
(“When state and local law enforcement officers arrest and book someone into custody for a 
violation of a criminal offense, they generally fingerprint the person . . . .  DHS receives 
these fingerprints from the FBI, so that ICE can determine if that person is also subject to 
removal (deportation) . . . .  In cases where the person appears from these checks to be 
removable, ICE may issue a detainer on the person, requesting that the state or local jail 
facility hold the individual no more than an extra 48 hours (excluding weekends and 
holidays) to allow for an interview of the person.”).  Interestingly, there is no statutory 
authority for these detainers outside of the context of drug crimes.  8 U.S.C. § 1357(d) 
(2006) (authorizing  detainers “for a violation of controlled substances laws” only). 
173 AARTI KOHLI ET AL., CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN INST. OF LAW & SOC. POL’Y, 
SECURE COMMUNITIES BY THE NUMBERS: AN ANALYSIS OF DEMOGRAPHICS AND DUE PROCESS 
2 (2011), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Secure_Communities_by_the_
Numbers.pdf (“Approximately 3,600 United States citizens have been arrested by ICE 
through the Secure Communities program.”). 
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participation in the program.
174
  In combination with the toxic rhetoric of 
the contemporary immigration debate, it is unsurprising that some law 
enforcement officers feel that it is their duty to more vigorously police 
populations that they identify as potentially “illegal.”  As a consequence, 
poor Latinos and individuals living in immigrant communities are 
increasingly likely to be stopped, arrested, and detained for low-level state 
and local criminal offenses as they are caught up in an informal dragnet 
aimed at immigration violators.
175
  On the other hand, the federal 
government maintains that the program has the ability to reduce profiling 
precisely because it eliminates state and local law enforcement discretion in 
immigration enforcement, and relies solely on federal screening for 
immigration enforcement decisions.
176
  This is plausible in theory, although 
it is apparently not yet a reality in practice. 
In short, state and local governments are now actively participating in 
the enforcement of federal immigration law.  In some cases, they are doing 
so because they erroneously believe that they have the inherent authority to 
do so. Increasingly, they are doing so at the behest of the federal 
government, sometimes even when they are not interested in dedicating 
their law enforcement resources to these efforts.
177
  The involvement of 
 
174 Id. at 3 (arguing that early data provides support for allegations that Secure 
Communities has increased racial profiling, but noting that additional study is needed). 
175 Id. at 6 (concluding that in some jurisdictions, Latinos are disproportionately 
“target[ed] . . . for minor violations and pre-textual arrests with the actual goal of initiating 
immigration checks through the Secure Communities system”); see also Letter from Thomas 
E. Perez, supra note 89, at 3 (describing racial profiling in immigration policing by the 
Maricopa County Sherriff’s Office); Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Attorney Gen., 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Joseph Maturo, Jr., Mayor of East Haven at 9 (Dec. 19, 2011), 
available at www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/easthaven_findletter_12-19-11.pdf 
(describing racial profiling in immigration policing by the EHPD).  A variety of immigrants’ 
rights organizations and academics have compiled reports that include descriptions of 
policing strategies that target Latinos and Latino neighborhoods.  See, e.g., WEISSMAN ET 
AL., THE POLICIES AND POLITICS OF LOCAL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT LAWS 8 (2009), 
available at http://www.law.unc.edu/documents/clinicalprograms/287gpolicyreview.pdf; 
SARAH WHITE & SALMUN KAZEROUNIAN, TENN. IMMIGRANT AND REFUGEE RIGHTS COAL., 
THE FORGOTTEN CONSTITUTION: RACIAL PROFILING AND IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IN 
BEDFORD COUNTY, TENNESSEE 6 (2011), available at http://www.tnimmigrant.org/storage/
The%20Forgotten%20Constitution.pdf. 
176 Secure Communities: Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS 
ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/secure_communities/ (last visited Nov. 28, 2012) 
(“Secure Communities reduces opportunities for racial or ethnic profiling because all people 
booked into jails are fingerprinted.”) (emphasis in original). 
177 DHS has clearly stated that it is a “fact” that jurisdictions cannot opt out of the 
program.  See Secure Communities: Get the Facts, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGR. 
& CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/secure_communities/get-the-facts.htm (last 
visited June 4, 2012).  The agency has maintained this position even when confronted with 
representatives from jurisdictions that have been skeptical of or hostile to the program. See, 
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literally hundreds of thousands of additional law enforcement agents in the 
policing of immigration substantially widens the net that the government is 
using to catch immigration violators.  In the short term, at least, this has 
compounded the policing problems that aggressive immigration 
enforcement has generated in the past. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS: OVERCRIMINALIZATION? 
It should be clear from the foregoing discussion that there has been an 
increased criminalization of immigration in recent years.  Federal 
prosecutions of immigration are at all-time record highs, and immigration 
offenses are now the single most commonly prosecuted federal criminal 
offenses.  State and local governments now are assisting actively in federal 
immigration enforcement efforts.  Moreover, states and localities are 
attempting to regulate immigration through their own laws, which routinely 
include criminal ordinances. 
Aggregate per capita expenditure on law enforcement by local, state, 
and federal governments remained flat—and even fell slightly when 
adjusted for inflation—in the period from 2002 through 2007.178  At the 
federal level, per capita expenditures for judicial and legal services declined 
7% in this period, as did per capita expenditure on corrections, while per 
capita expenditure on protection fell 2%.
179
  Yet during this period, 
expenditures on immigration enforcement expanded significantly, meaning 
that such expenditures have put even further fiscal pressure on other 
enforcement efforts and on other government programs.  It is difficult to 
 
e.g., Brian Bennett, Deportations Won’t Require States’ OK, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2011, at 
AA2 (reporting that DHS informed governors that they could not opt out of the program, 
notwithstanding the fact that “Governors in California, Illinois, Massachusetts and several 
other states have complained that the effort also has ensnared thousands of minor offenders, 
including some who were arrested but not yet tried or convicted, and has deterred some 
crime victims from coming forward to aid police” and “[s]everal governors had announced 
their intention to withdraw from the program [or] refused to sign agreements”).  
Notwithstanding the absence of opt-out provisions, some jurisdictions have continued to 
seek ways to limit their participation in the program.  See, e.g., Liz Farmer, D.C. Council 
Bucking ICE’s Secure Communities, WASH. EXAMINER (Nov. 15, 2011), 
http://washingtonexaminer.com/local/2011/11/dc-council-bucking-ices-secure-communities/
120394 (discussing Washington D.C.’s efforts to enact similar limitations); Santa Clara 
County Ends Collaboration with ICE, NEW AM. MEDIA (Oct. 18, 2011), 
http://newamericamedia.org/2011/10/santa-clara-county-ends-collaboration-with-ice.php 
(discussing Santa Clara County’s efforts to limit cooperation by limiting the detainer 
individuals flagged by the database check). 
178 TRACEY KYCKELHAHN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
JUSTICE EXPENDITURES AND EMPLOYMENT, FY 1982–2007—STATISTICAL TABLES 2 (2011), 
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/jee8207st.pdf. 
179 Id. 
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determine exactly what is happening on the state level, but similar trends 
are probably emerging in states with an active immigration-enforcement 
agenda.  Several scholars have recently noted that states have moved to 
focus scarce criminal justice resources on traditional criminal justice 
areas.
180
  Yet this is happening at a time when states and localities are 
aiming new criminal sanctions and new enforcement efforts at unauthorized 




The question is whether this constitutes overcriminalization.  
Overcriminalization occurs when a legislature defines too many different 
activities as “crime,” when the system excessively punishes offenses, or 
both.  Scholars have condemned the U.S. criminal justice system for both 
punishing too much conduct and punishing conduct too harshly, and the 
word “overcriminalization” is frequently applied to U.S. criminal law and 
law enforcement.
182
  In a system characterized by overcriminalization, law 
enforcement operates with an undesirable degree of unchecked discretion, 
procedural protections are undercut, and scarce resources are misallocated 
in crime control efforts.
183
 
All of the major problems associated with overcriminalization appear 
 
180 Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., From “Overcriminalization” to “Smart on Crime”: American 
Criminal Justice Reform—Legacy and Prospects, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 597, 610–11 (2011); 
Mary D. Fan, Beyond Budget-Cut Criminal Justice: The Future of Penal Law, 90 N.C. L. 
REV. 581, 583 (2012). 
181 See Lacey, Sex Crimes Were Ignored, supra note 85 (discussing the Maricopa County 
Sheriff’s Department’s failure to prosecute sex crimes); Robbins, supra note 130 (discussing 
the general decline in felony prosecutions along the southern border with the rise of 
misdemeanor illegal entry prosecutions). 
182 See, e.g., DOUGLAS N. HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL 
LAW 3 (2008) (“The two most distinctive characteristics of both federal and state systems of 
criminal justice in the United States during the past several years are the dramatic expansion 
in the substantive criminal law and the extraordinary rise in the use of punishment.”); 
Sanford H. Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 374 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. 
SCI. 157, 158 (1967); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 
MICH. L. REV. 505, 512–18 (2001).  For some efforts to define “overcriminalization” more 
precisely, see, for example, Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of Overcriminalization: From 
Morals and Mattress Tags to Overfederalization, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 747, 749 (2005) (“[T]he 
common features of overcriminalization include the following: (1) excessive unchecked 
discretion in enforcement authorities, (2) inevitable disparity among similarly situated 
persons, (3) potential for abuse by enforcement authorities, (4) potential to undermine other 
significant values and evade significant procedural protections, and (5) misdirection of 
scarce resources (opportunity costs).”); Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 
AM. U. L. REV. 703, 717 (2005) (“[T]he overcriminalization phenomenon consists of: (1) 
untenable offenses; (2) superfluous statutes; (3) doctrines that overextend culpability; (4) 
crimes without jurisdictional authority; (5) grossly disproportionate punishments; and (6) 
excessive or pretextual enforcement of petty violations.”). 
183 See Beale, supra note 182, at 749; Luna, supra note 182, at 717. 
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in contemporary immigration enforcement.  By imposing criminal law 
solutions on what is (and has always been) primarily an issue of labor 
migration flow,
184
 legislatures have not only failed to address the central 
dynamics that drive migration,
185
 but have also created a series of 
undesirable and expensive byproducts.  The failure of the policies of 
criminalization is evident in the numbers.  Although harsh criminal 
enforcement of immigration laws may be having a marginal effect on 
migration flows,
186
 any such effect has come at huge cost and could likely 
have been attained through more effective migration policy outside of the 
criminal sphere. 
First, there is the monetary cost.  The resources meted out to achieve 
the criminal punishment of migrants are disproportionate to the problem 
and corrosive to the overall balance of resources in the criminal justice 
system.  As previously noted, the cost of immigration enforcement is 
crowding out other investments in criminal justice, particularly during a 
time of scarce resources.  Whether through deliberate policy choices or 
through the necessity of allocating scarce resources, the current immigration 
enforcement agenda skews spending toward the prosecution of migration 
offenders and away from the prosecution of violent and dangerous 
 
184 BILL ONG HING, ETHICAL BORDERS: NAFTA, GLOBALIZATION AND MEXICAN 
MIGRATION 9–28 (2010) (discussing the labor market effects of NAFTA, including the 
production of increased unauthorized labor flow from Mexico); KEVIN R. JOHNSON, OPENING 
THE FLOODGATES: WHY AMERICA NEEDS TO RETHINK ITS BORDERS AND IMMIGRATION LAWS 
119 (2007) (“It is unquestionably the case that economic forces bring the majority of 
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Hence, it is presently impossible to determine whether criminal enforcement has had any 
significant effect on migration flow.  But would-be migrants who are undeterred by the very 
real and well-known threats of robbery, serious violence, rape, sexual assault, and death in 
the desert in the course of northward migration seem likely to give very little weight to the 
possibility of criminal sanctions when deciding whether to undertake the journey.  Clearly, 
for some, the forces that compel migration are powerful enough to overcome even the most 
severe criminal sanctions they might face. 




Moreover, converting immigration enforcement into a criminal 
problem has resulted in several harms that are classically understood as 
symptoms of overcriminalization.  One harm is racial profiling.  Because 
immigration status is impossible to determine at a glance, officials who are 
enforcing immigration laws without knowledge of a particular individual’s 
status are necessarily relying on profiling—and particularly the racial 
profiling of those of “Mexican appearance” that courts have judicially 
sanctioned in immigration enforcement
188—to make stops and arrests for 
immigration violations.  As state-level criminal sanctions aimed directly at 
migrants continue to proliferate, the number of actors making these race-
reliant stops will increase, and racial profiling will increase as well.  The 
Supreme Court’s refusal to uphold the preliminary injunction of Section 2 
of Arizona’s S.B. 1070, which authorizes state and local officials’ 
investigations into immigration status, ensures that in Arizona and other 
states, sub-federal actors will be actively engaged in immigration policing.  
Available data already establishes that many investigators are 
disproportionately stopping and arresting Latinos for various other low-
level criminal offenses in an effort to catch noncitizens in the immigration 
enforcement dragnet.  Indeed, one of the lead charges against Latinos in 
counties with 287(g) programs is “driving without a license”—a charge that 
cannot even be established until a stop is made.  The fact that such charges 
against Latinos have risen drastically and in ways that are completely out of 
proportion to the presence of Latinos in the general population suggests that 
immigration enforcement is a driving force in the rise of misdemeanor 
charges against Latinos.
189
  In this way, the criminalization of migration 
also has fueled the overcriminalization of misdemeanors committed by a 
particular racial group.  Unless and until more restrictive guidelines on the 
use of race are promulgated and the proliferation of migration-related 
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offenses decreases, it is all but certain that the recent and rapid rise in 
Latino incarceration will continue. 
In addition to the procedural harms generated by profiling, a distinct 
set of procedural harms has accrued as a result of the “streamlined” 
procedural mechanisms used to obtain convictions for illegal entry and 
felony reentry.  In criminal courts along the southern border, illegal entry 
pleas are counseled only nominally, with six to ten defendants pleading at a 
time with the assistance of one public defender.
190
  The Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure concerning plea agreements are routinely and 
systematically violated in these procedures.
191
  Disparate sentences for 
identically situated defendants are meted out for illegal reentry, depending 
on where a defendant happens to be apprehended.
192
  And as different states 
enact differing criminal provisions as a form of indirect regulation of 
migration, the disparate interstate treatment of individuals whose only 
genuine offense is presence without authorization will increase. 
“[T]he criminal sanction should be reserved for specific behaviors and 
mental states that are so wrongful and harmful to their direct victims or the 
general public as to justify the official condemnation and denial of freedom 
that flow from a guilty verdict.”193  At the moment, nearly half of federal 
prosecutions target noncitizens whose only crime is their decision to act on 
their desire to work and live in a place that affords greater opportunity for 
themselves and for their children.  Our society certainly faces costs and 
challenges associated with unauthorized migration and should work to forge 
policies that effectively address the issue.  But reliance on the criminal law 
is not the solution and generates many new problems, including racial 
profiling, unequal treatment of similarly situated defendants, overreliance 
on (expensive) incarceration, and the underemphasis of other, more 
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important law enforcement goals. 
 
